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Migala: The Vacancies Act and an Acting Attorney General

THE VACANCIES ACT AND AN ACTING
ATTORNEY GENERAL†
Stephen Migala*
ABSTRACT
The President’s November 2018 designation of Matthew Whitaker
to be the Acting Attorney General was unprecedented and calls into
question several legal issues. Though many are based on questions of
constitutionality, there is a strong and novel argument that the statute
used by the President to designate Mr. Whitaker, the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), may not be used in such a way.
Instead, a separate office-specific statute, 28 U.S.C. § 508, alone
controls who may become the Acting Attorney General. By presenting
never-before-seen legislative histories to support that conclusion, and
by separately applying well-settled canons of statutory construction, it
also becomes clear that FVRA cannot be used to designate persons to
act in other offices that have their own specific succession statute.
INTRODUCTION
The day after the 2018 national congressional election, the President
took an unprecedented action. By appointing Matthew Whitaker as
Acting Attorney General, the President, for the first time in the history
of the Department of Justice, designated someone to act as Attorney
General who was not an officer of the United States.1 That Mr.
Whitaker served for roughly 100 days, and that the President placed
him in office after effectively removing the former Attorney General,
†

Editor’s Note: At the request of the author, a limited number of citations in this Article deviate from THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015)
in an attempt to make the Article more accessible to its readers.
*
Stephen Migala is an attorney based in the District of Columbia and earned a J.D. and an LL.M. in
National Security Law from Georgetown Law. He expresses his personal opinions not made on behalf of
any entity.
1. This statement does not account for recess appointments, only designations to act as Attorney
General.
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makes the situation all the more unprecedented and legally suspect on
several distinct grounds rooted in statute and the Constitution.
But rather than address grave constitutional questions that courts
tend to consider last or altogether avoid, this Article aims to focus on
a principal and dispositive argument that has generally been
overlooked: the statutory law used to designate Mr. Whitaker as Acting
Attorney General—the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998
(FVRA)2—may not be used to designate someone to act as Attorney
General. Instead, the authority to act as Attorney General is derived
from one statute alone: 28 U.S.C. § 508. That authority automatically
vests the power to act in the Deputy Attorney General and several other
Senate-confirmed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials in a specified
sequence.3 It is not subject to presidential discretion, it is not subverted
or displaced by FVRA, and most significantly, the President may not
choose between FVRA and § 508 to determine who can become
Acting Attorney General.
This Article will show that since 1873, all prior versions of FVRA,
known as the “Vacancies Act,” gave presidents broad discretion to
appoint Senate-confirmed officers—but they consistently and
expressly excluded only one office from that broad authority: that of
Attorney General. The most recent version of the Vacancies Act,
FVRA, was enacted in 1998 and aimed to continue that long-standing
axiom. While FVRA omitted the stand-alone clause that explicitly
exempted the office of Attorney General from the reach of any
Vacancies Act, FVRA functionally retained that clause within a
broader and subsuming categorical exemption. In other words, by
categorically exempting automatic succession statutes like § 508,
FVRA not only continued the 125-year exemption for the office of
Attorney General, but also exempted many other high-level offices
where Congress already designated a distinct order of succession.
In arriving at this conclusion, this Article takes a position directly
contrary to that of DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), whose
November 2018 opinion expressly sanctioned the appointment of Mr.
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d (2018).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2018).
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Whitaker.4 But, as this Article will show, OLC’s opinion and reasoning
contained many flaws and incorrect assumptions. To elucidate OLC’s
errors, this Article analyzes the plain text of FVRA, its statutory
evolution, the perceived ill the law attempted to remedy, key floor
statements by its principal authors, contemporary understandings,
historical practices, canons of statutory construction, and other context
to dispel each of OLC’s main points in turn.
But beyond simply discrediting OLC’s arguments, this Article also
argues in the affirmative by providing clear support for its own
position with legislative histories not recounted anywhere else. Using
contemporaneous congressional memoranda and transcripts recently
made available from the National Archives, alongside documents from
the archives of three of the key sponsoring Senators, this Article’s
conclusion becomes even more evident: FVRA cannot override the
automatic, specific, and required authority in 28 U.S.C. § 508 for
certain designated officers to act as Attorney General.
The consequence of this conclusion is significant and is not made
lightly. It means that the law the President relied on to appoint Mr.
Whitaker, and on which Mr. Whitaker’s authority relied, cannot be
used. It also means that under the same FVRA statute, any official
functions or duties assigned by Congress solely to the Attorney
General and taken by Mr. Whitaker while acting in that office were
void ab initio and may not later be ratified.
While this Article focuses on FVRA and § 508, the analysis
performed here is equally applicable to any office for which Congress
has specifically designated an order of succession. In the case of such
office-specific succession statutes, including § 508, it will be shown
that the President has no authority or discretion to subvert them using
FVRA or any other general statute.

4. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download [https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY].
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ROADMAP
To conduct a thoughtful analysis, the key statutes, as they currently
stand, must first be understood. To aid in this preliminary step,
sections I.A and I.B introduce relevant parts of the two main statutes
at issue: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 508, which sets forth an automatic order of
succession for the office of Attorney General; and (2) 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3345–3349d, FVRA, which broadly allows the President to fill
various vacancies subject to certain limitations.
Those familiar with the two statutes may wish to begin at Part II,
where helpful histories regarding both laws are presented. There,
sections A and B explain the history of § 508 and the Vacancies Act
to show the continuity of the long-standing axiom that § 508 cannot be
displaced or avoided in favor of a vacancies act. Afterwards, section C
summarizes the context for what led Congress to pass the newest
version of the Vacancies Act, FVRA.
Section III.A then amplifies that context with analysis and archival
attestations. By presenting never-before-published legislative histories
of FVRA, enormous light is shone on what Congress intended to
accomplish and what it thought its words would mean. Tied together
with the statutory and contextual histories presented in preceding parts,
OLC’s principal arguments supporting Mr. Whitaker’s appointment,
succinctly introduced there, begin to deflate. Next, section III.B briefly
analyzes the two statutes according to basic principles of statutory
construction before offering the most harmonious way to read the two
statutes, give effect to each, and honor both the text and intent of
Congress. Section III.C then analyzes the related issue of enforcement
against those who do not legally act in another office. Finally, this
Article’s conclusions are summarized in Part IV.
For those who wish to view the full context of the
never-before-published documents on which parts of this Article rely
and which were gathered from across four separate archives,5 this link,

5. The four being the National Archives in Washington, D.C.; Senator Byrd’s papers at his Center in
Shepherdstown, West Virginia; Senator Thompson’s papers at the Modern Political Archives in
Knoxville, Tennessee; and Senator Glenn’s Archives in Columbus, Ohio.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/4

4

Migala: The Vacancies Act and an Acting Attorney General

2020]

THE VACANCIES ACT

703

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&art
icle=3018&context=gsulr&type=additional, provides a full appendix
consisting of the whole part of every document excerpted herein and a
few others which, for sake of space, were not. When referenced in this
Article, each excerpt will append a bracketed citation, pointing to the
page in the appendix where the whole document may be viewed, for
example, “[App. at __ ].”6
I. The Two Relevant Statutes
An analysis always begins at the text of a statute. To facilitate that,
this Article first presents key text and summaries of the statutes at play:
28 U.S.C. § 508 and FVRA.7
A. The Specific Succession Statute for the Office of Attorney
General (§ 508)
The authority to act in the office of Attorney General in case of
vacancy is vested in certain officers by 28 U.S.C. § 508. With a lineage
that traces back to DOJ’s Organic Act in 1870, this statute has, for
nearly 150 years, entrusted leadership of DOJ to only certain senior
and Senate-confirmed officers within the same department.8 The
succession is automatic and vests power immediately. No action,
paperwork, or other authorization is required. From the moment of
vacancy or other qualifying reason, the designee is immediately
empowered. The statute is couched in mandatory terms and thus
affords no other discretion or displacement from its own required
order. So important is the position, that in case one identified officer
6. Each document cited in the appendix has been reviewed by and is on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review. For ease of accessibility for all readers, these archival documents may be
referenced
online,
at
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?filename=0&article=3018&context=gsulr&type=additional
[https://perma.cc/TYC89YA2], and are more directly found by pagination referenced as “[App. at __].”
7. FVRA (/fɪvrə/) is used for ease of reading as an acronym in lieu of the more tedious definite article
and initialism: “the FVRA.”
8. Act of July 20, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162; Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, 3 C.F.R.
135 (Supp. 1953), reprinted in 67 Stat. 636 (1953); Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378,
612 (codifying the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953 into positive law at 28 U.S.C. § 508); Act of Oct.
19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-139, 91 Stat. 1171 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 508(b)).
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cannot assume the office, the statute has evolved to include many more
designees in a further order of succession.9 The Attorney General
Succession Statute, or “§ 508” for short, reads as follows:
§ 508. Vacancies
(a) In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General,
or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney
General may exercise all the duties of that office, and for
the purpose of section 3345 of title 5 [a specific
cross-reference to a single section in the Vacancies Act]
the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the
Attorney General.
(b) When by reason of absence, disability, or vacancy in
office, neither the Attorney General nor the Deputy
Attorney General is available to exercise the duties of
the office of Attorney General, the Associate Attorney
General shall act as Attorney General. The Attorney
General may designate the Solicitor General and the
Assistant Attorneys General, in further order of
succession, to act as Attorney General.10
Immediately, to avoid brewing a misconception, it must be noted
that some have been confused by the “may” provision in subsection
(a). As will be explained in more detail in section II.A, this term “may”
is not the law. And it does not denote a possibility that a confirmed
Deputy Attorney General might not become Acting Attorney General
in case of vacancy. Rather, it was a stylistic choice by codifiers to use
different words when the source law from 1870 was incorporated into
Title 28 of the U.S. Code.11 The source law used the words “shall have
9. 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2018). Today, the number of identified officers is fourteen and includes: one
Deputy Attorney General, one Associate Attorney General, one Solicitor General, and eleven Assistant
Attorneys General. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5315 (2018).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 508.
11. H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 182 (1965) (stating that “[t]he words ‘may appoint’ are substituted for

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/4

6

Migala: The Vacancies Act and an Acting Attorney General

2020]

THE VACANCIES ACT

705

power” and stated that power was “vested.”12 Moreover, the law’s
principal author, President Eisenhower, stated that the automatic
assumption of a vacant office of the Attorney General was
“required.”13 Thus, for this statute, do not be misled by “may.”
The more important point to remember is the “shall act” provision
in subsection (b) and the overall import of the section. As is evident by
its text, this entire section ultimately means to have some
Senate-confirmed DOJ officer serve as Acting Attorney General in
case of vacancy. The only variable is whether the designated officer is
in office, and if said office is empty, who is next in the predesignated
and automatic order of succession. Legislative histories and previous
versions of the law all firmly support this textual and commonsense
reading.
B. The General Succession Statute for Vacancies in Offices:
FVRA (§§ 3345–3349d)
Authority to act in Senate-confirmed offices is more broadly
controlled by a generic, general succession statute: the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, or FVRA for short. It was through this
statute that the President believed he had the authority to designate
then-chief of staff and DOJ-employee Matthew Whitaker to be the
Acting Attorney General.14

‘is authorized to appoint’”); id. at 184 (stating that with regard to § 508, “[t]he word ‘may’ is substituted
for ‘have the power’”; but not noting the stylistic choice to omit “shall”). While the 1966 law was used to
codify Title 5 into positive law, it also transferred provisions that were formerly arranged in Title 5 to
other titles, as here. Id. Like all changes made in the law, the House Report stressed “no substantive
change[s]” were made. Id. at 1, 3.
12. See discussion infra section II.A. “Shall have power” was a common historical way of granting
authority. E.g., U.S. CONST. passim (thirteen times using “shall have power”); 16 Stat. passim (at least
fifty-six times using “shall have power”); Act of Mar. 7, 1870, ch. 23, 16 Stat. 75 (“[A]ny officer or
clerk . . . shall have power to administer oaths . . . in . . . any such investigation.”).
13. See infra note 50.
14. That belief was supported by an opinion by DOJ’s OLC. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42
Op. O.L.C., slip op. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download
[https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY].
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Vacancies acts have existed in one form or another since 1792.15
And the version in place today can be traced directly back to 1868,16
even before the beginnings of § 508. FVRA is codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3345–3349d. To show how the statute works generally, FVRA is
summarized below. The key section most impacting this Article’s
inquiry is § 3347, which is presented last.
1. FVRA Offers Three Paths to Act in a Higher Vacant PAS
Office
Distilled, FVRA’s § 3345 offers three paths to fill a vacancy in what
is known as a “PAS” office (those requiring presidential appointment
and Senate confirmation):
•

•

•

(a)(1) The first is the default automatic provision, which
requires no action from the President; it states that the
“first assistant” shall perform the duties of the vacant
office (in the case of the office of Attorney General, a
separate statute confirms the first assistant to be the
Deputy Attorney General (28 U.S.C. § 508));
(a)(2) The second path may displace the first default path
at the discretion of the President, who may instead
designate a person currently serving in any office that
required Senate confirmation (a PAS officer);
(a)(3) The third is a more recent option, added in 1998,
that allows the President to displace the default
provision, so long as the chosen designee is an officer or
employee of the same agency, who, during the last year,
has served for at least ninety days in a position paid to a
level of at least a GS-15.17 This was the option employed

15. E.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281 (applying only to the Departments of State,
Treasury, and War).
16. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168.
17. Though not the topic of this Article, it bears mention that this third category was added at the last
minute to ensure the bill would not be vetoed by the President. The first version of (a)(3) would have
required a designee to have served for 180 days and excluded noncareer appointees.
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by the President to appoint Mr. Whitaker, who met the
requirements of this provision.
2. FVRA Conveys Nearly All Usual Powers to Acting Officers
A person designated or assuming office through any one of these
three paths retains all “functions and duties” of the office as if the
acting officer had been confirmed by the Senate. Acting officers only
have a few minor differences from Senate-confirmed officers.18 They
include retaining the pay and duties of their first post, not having the
honorific of a formal commission, and not being eligible for succession
under the 25th Amendment.19
3. FVRA’s Time Limits for Acting Officers
There are time limitations imposed for any person acting under
FVRA. They can be summarized as a baseline of 210 days, with an
additional 210 days added if a different person is nominated to the
Senate but not confirmed, plus yet another 210-day period if that
occurs again.20 That totals 630 possible days outside of the
confirmation process prescribed by the Constitution. That time is
extended even further for however long either the first or second
nomination remains pending before the Senate.21
On top of that, when a vacancy occurs within 60 days of
inauguration day for a new President, any time period is reset and
deemed to begin 90 days after either the vacancy arose or inauguration

18. In theory, statutes could restrict the ability of acting officials to perform certain duties, but such
statutes have not been found, and if any do exist, they would be incredibly rare.
19. A separate and significant argument, not detailed here, is that acting officers do not have authority
to appoint inferior officers. This is thought to be true because the Constitution offers only two methods to
become a regular department head, also considered a principal officer: confirmation by the Senate or
appointment during a recess. The discretion that the Constitution affords to Congress to give department
heads powers of appointment for certain inferior officers thus necessarily carries that same definition. But
acting department heads are inferior officers. And because the Constitution’s text does not empower one
inferior officer to appoint another, an acting department head cannot appoint an inferior officer. E.g.,
Designation of Acting Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 122–23 (2003) (arguing
that a person temporarily performing the duties of a principal office is an inferior officer).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 3346 (2018).
21. Id. § 3346(b).

Published by Reading Room, 2020

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

708

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

day, whichever is later.22 This means that upon a new vacancy, and at
the outer limits of FVRA, 150 more days could be added to the usual
630-day limit, totaling 780 days, or 2 years and 50 days—plus the time
a nomination sits in the Senate. For all of that time, a single
unconfirmed person could act in an office Congress intended to be
filled by a Senate-confirmed official.
The troubling time period that FVRA allots will not be analyzed by
this Article against the Constitution’s Appointment Clause in Article
II. Nor will it be analyzed against the Recess Appointments Clause, an
appointment through which would last, at its theoretical maximum
based on current practice, a few days shy of two years.23
As has been noted already, courts typically do not reach
constitutional questions if issues can be resolved by statute, and this
Article attempts to follow that axiom. Needless to say, the time
allotments for acting officials are suspect.
For historical reference, the time limits for acting officials under
various iterations of the vacancies acts have evolved in this way:
1792—no limit; 1795—six months; 1863—six months; 1868—10
days; 1891—30 days; 1988—120 days, with two additional 120-day
periods after a returned nomination and added time for a pending
nomination; and 1998—210 days, with two additional periods, and
more time for new administration transitions and nominations pending
before the Senate.24
4. FVRA’s Exemptions
Section 3347 of FVRA is as significant as any other provision of
law for the purposes of this Article’s analyses. Meant to override
22. Id. § 3349a.
23. Of course, today’s congressional sessions last nearly the entire year, whereas the need for early
vacancies acts was more obvious when, for example, regular sessions of the first ten Congresses to 1809
only averaged 141 days in session each year, and in that same time, recesses between any session, regular
or special, averaged 187 days.
24. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281; Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415, 415;
Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 656, 656; Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168, 168; Act of
Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26 Stat. 733, 733; Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 426
(codification act carrying no changes); Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-398,
§ 7(b), 102 Stat. 985, 988 (1988). Note too, that the time periods varied depending on sickness, death,
resignation, and other qualified conditions to trigger various vacancies acts.
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“housekeeping” provisions in organic acts that give department heads
broad power to appoint any person to act in virtually any inferior
office, FVRA employs a common legislative tactic called “catch and
release” to ensure it is considered first and before other legislation. The
word “exclusive” is FVRA’s attempt to “catch” all other laws
regarding appointment. It then lists two primary ways, in paragraphs
(1)(A) and (1)(B), to “release” its primacy and not override other laws
governing appointment it did not mean to displace.25 Section 3347’s
relevant parts read:
(a) [Prior FVRA sections] are the exclusive means for
temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the
functions and duties of any office . . . unless–
(1) a statutory provision expressly–
(A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of
an Executive department, to designate an officer
or employee to perform the functions and duties
of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity; or
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office
temporarily in an acting capacity; or
(2) the President makes an appointment to fill a vacancy
in such office during the recess of the Senate . . . .
(b) Any statutory provision providing general authority to
the head of an Executive agency . . . to delegate duties
statutorily vested in that agency head to, or to reassign

25. The Senate Report described these laws as “retained,” and also listed around forty-some known
statutes that would be retained, including 28 U.S.C. § 508. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 15–16 (1998) (missing
numbers twenty-six and twenty-seven in the list of forty-some statutes).
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duties among, officers or employees of such Executive
agency, is not a statutory provision to which subsection
(a)(1) applies.26
Subsection (b) and the types of statutes it precludes were the
primary focus of FVRA. Known as “general housekeeping” or
“vesting and delegation” statutes, these were widely used by presidents
and department heads to avoid the Senate but still functionally appoint
persons to Senate-confirmable positions. Since every Executive
department,27 and many other agencies,28 had vesting and delegation
statutes, the bypass of the constitutional Senate-confirmation process
became widespread to the point where an estimated 20% of main
Executive department PAS positions were made through such
“housekeeping” statutes.29 DOJ was one of the worst offenders, and it
often used its housekeeping statutes at 28 U.S.C. §§ 509 and 51030 to
avoid the confirmation process.31 When several high-profile DOJ

26. 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (2018).
27. Every Executive department has vesting and delegation authorities. They are presented here in the
order they were enacted but cite to their current codified location. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509–510 (2018)
(DOJ); 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a) (2018) (State Dep’t); 31 U.S.C. § 321(b), (c) (2018) (Treasury); 10 U.S.C.
§ 113(b), (d) (2018) (DoD); Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 164 (Supp. 1950), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. app. at 138 (2018) (Interior); Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1953),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 159–61 (2018) (Agriculture); 7 U.S.C. § 6912 (2018) (also Agriculture);
Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 165 (Supp. 1950), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 138–39
(2018) (Commerce); Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 165 (Supp. 1950), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 139 (2018) (Labor); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 131–32 (Supp. 1953), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 157–59 (2018) (HHS); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3534, 3535(d) (2018) (HUD); 49 U.S.C. § 322
(2018) (DOT); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7151, 7152, 7252 (2018) (Energy); 20 U.S.C. §§ 3441, 3473, 3742 (2018)
(Education); 38 U.S.C. §§ 303, 512 (2018) (Veterans Affairs); 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(3), (b) (2018) (DHS).
28. For example, the Office of Thrift Supervision. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a(e)(1), 1462a(h)(1), 1464
(1998).
29. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-892, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS
ACTS
TO
PROTECT
THE
SENATE’S
CONFIRMATION
PREROGATIVE
1
(1998),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19981102_98-892_e35b004e5166781e938da36cf87598c023b036
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK7L-M94M].
30. Section 509 “vests” all powers of DOJ in the Attorney General and § 510 allows the department
head to make provisions to “delegate” any of his function. 28 U.S.C. § 509 (“All functions of other
officers . . . and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice are vested in the
Attorney General except the functions [of Administrative Law Judges and a wholly owned government
corporation, FPI (neither group has PAS officers)]”); id. § 510 (“The Attorney General
may . . . authoriz[e] the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of
Justice of any function of the Attorney General.”).
31. ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 2.
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positions were filled in that manner, it drew the ire of the Senate and
specifically prompted the congressional action that resulted in
FVRA.32
As will be shown, legislative history is abundantly clear that
FVRA’s primary aim was to target these “housekeeping” statutes,
especially §§ 509 and 510. But in clear contrast, § 508 and other
automatic succession statutes described in § 3347(a)(1)(B) were to
remain controlling and unaffected.33
II. Statutory Histories
With the current text of FVRA and § 508 introduced and explained,
it is next prudent to understand how these laws came to be and how
they have changed. Those histories obviously would have impacted
Congress’s decision to either keep, omit, or change certain provisions
in those statutes over time.
A. History of § 508: An Automatic Acting AG Based on a Specific
Statute
As far back as 1870, when the Department of Justice was first
created, it was evident that Congress always intended for only certain
specified and Senate-confirmed DOJ officials to lead the department
in case of vacancy.34 At the birth of DOJ, the office of Solicitor
General was created as second-in-command and was concurrently
given the power to act as Attorney General.35 Later, amid Congress’s
expansion of the department and its addition of new senior offices, that

32. Id. at 3–4.
33. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12,824 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHZ6-TQXE] (statement of
Sen. Robert Byrd) (“Moreover, in an effort to squarely address past problems, the Act specifically
prohibits the use of general, ‘housekeeping’ statutes as a basis for circumventing the Vacancies Act.
Provisions such as, but not limited to, 28 U.S.C. §§ 509 and 510, which vest all functions of the
Department of Justice in the Attorney General and allow the Attorney General to delegate responsibility
for carrying out those functions, shall not be construed as providing an alternative means of filling
vacancies.”); S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 10 (1998) (describing the need for and legislative history of what
became FVRA).
34. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162.
35. Id.
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power to act was transferred to other Senate-confirmed officials in a
specified order of succession.
As a result of several additions and amendments, the
automatic-acting-authority provision from DOJ’s Organic Act was
reworded several times, sometimes awkwardly by codifiers, to insert
newly created senior positions. But despite the changes in that
succession order, § 508’s central purpose to automatically vest
authority in a designated officer never waivered through all that time.
Only the designated recipient of that authority changed. Once traced,
an objective reader will see that the authority still remains as steadfast
as it was in 1870. Today, § 508 vests automatic succession powers first
in the Deputy Attorney General, next in the Associate Attorney
General, and then to either the Solicitor General or several Assistant
Attorneys General, in an order determined by the Attorney General.
1. 1870–1953: Succession in DOJ’s Organic Act
The first succession provision to the office of Attorney General was
enacted within the 1870 Organic Act that established DOJ.36 Beyond
creating the department, the act also created the new office of Solicitor
General. The act directed that the Solicitor General shall be an “officer
learned in law,” and it immediately gave automatic authority to the
Solicitor General to act as Attorney General in case of vacancy:
[The Solicitor General] in case of a vacancy in the office of
Attorney-General, or in his absence or disability, shall have
power to exercise all the duties of that office.37
That 1870 law remained substantively the same for eighty-three
years, until 1953.38 Later, in the 1950s, Presidents Truman and
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Compare id. (“That there shall be in said Department an officer learned in the law, to assist the
Attorney-General in the performance of his duties, to be called the solicitor-general, and who, in case of
a vacancy in the office of Attorney-General, or in his absence or disability, shall have power to exercise
all the duties of that office.”), with 5 U.S.C. § 293 (1952) (“In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney
General, or of his absence or disability, the Solicitor General shall have power to exercise all the duties
of that office.”).
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Eisenhower, using specific authority granted to the presidency by
Congress, 39 reorganized and made significant changes to several
agencies and departments, including DOJ. As presented visually in
figures below, DOJ was relevantly affected by two Reorganization
Plans: No. 2 of 1950 and No. 4 of 1953.40 Those Reorganization Plans
carried the full weight of law and were incorporated into both the
Statutes at Large and the U.S. Code.41
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950 took the 1903-created and
Senate-confirmable office of “Assistant to the Attorney
General”—one which was “authorized” and was not required to be
filled42—and changed its name to “Deputy Attorney General.”43

Figure 1: The relevant excerpts of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950.
Typically, at that time, the second-ranking official in other
departments was an assistant secretary or an undersecretary. But in
39. Reorganization Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-109, § 2, 63 Stat. 203, 203.
40. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1953), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
159–61 (2018); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 135 (Supp. 1953), reprinted in 67 Stat. 636,
636 (1953).
41. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 291 (1958) (stating the codified laws then in force but supplementing as notes the
provisions of the Reorganization Plan). The Reorganization Act of 1949 gave the President authority to
create efficiencies and eliminate redundancies. § 2, 63 Stat. at 203. One of several areas Congress directed
any plan to consider was “the authorization of any officer to delegate any of his functions.” Id. § 3(5).
Once a President transmitted a plan to Congress, it could either disapprove the plan or take no action and
have it become law.
42. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1006, § 1, 32 Stat. 1062, 1062 (“[T]he President is authorized
to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an assistant to the Attorney-General.”
(emphasis added)), with Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (“[T]here shall be in the said
Department an officer learned in the law . . . to be called the solicitor-general.” (emphasis added)).
43. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. § 163 (Supp. 1950), reprinted in 64 Stat. 1261, 1261
(1950) (“The title of ‘The Assistant to the Attorney General’ is hereby changed to ‘Deputy Attorney
General.’”). Since only the title of the position was substituted, the 1903 qualifier that the President “is
authorized to appoint” was later changed by 1966 codifiers to read “the President may appoint . . . a
Deputy Attorney General.” E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 504 (2018); H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 182 (1965).
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DOJ, there were differing titles and rank structures. The position
renamed to that of Deputy was made to reflect how the position had
evolved to function as more of an assistant-secretary or
management-type role, vice a more administrative role.44 Still, the
Solicitor General, who over time became increasingly focused on
Supreme Court litigation rather than department management, was still
the number-two official in DOJ and next in the Organic Act’s line of
succession. And indeed, for about three years after the 1950 Plan, the
Solicitor General had the power to act as Attorney General (and in fact
did),45 but the title and responsibilities of the Deputy Attorney General
office carried with them a connotation that the position was the
second-in-command.46 Three years later in 1953, Reorganization Plan
No. 4 specifically addressed that oddity.47
2. 1953–1966: Succession in Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953 had two overt primary effects:
(1) it specifically stated that the powers “vested” in the Solicitor
General to act as Attorney General were transferred to the Deputy
Attorney General; and (2) it created a further order of succession to
have other senior, Senate-confirmed DOJ officials automatically act as
Attorney General.48

44. In an accompanying message to Congress, President Truman said that “[t]hese changes [] are
designed to reflect more accurately the position and responsibility of these two officials of the Department
of Justice.” Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plans 1
Through 13 of 1950, in TRUMAN LIBRARY, https://bit.ly/31rMp8V [https://perma.cc/D2QN-T6FM ] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
45. See Acting Attorneys Gen., 8 Op. O.L.C. 39, 40 (1984) (listing vacancies in the office of Attorney
General and showing who acted ad interim between a resignation and the next appointment, including
Solicitor General Phillip B. Perlman from April 7 to May 27, 1952).
46. See Deputy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) (“A substitute; a person duly authorized
by an officer to exercise some or all of the functions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the
latter.”).
47. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 135 (Supp. 1953), reprinted in 67 Stat. 636, 636
(1953).
48. Id.
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Figure 2: The relevant text of Reorganization Plan No. 4.
The first primary effect is simple enough to understand. The power
to automatically act in the office of Attorney General, which originated
in DOJ’s 1870 Organic Act and was vested in the Solicitor General,
simply went to the Deputy Attorney General.49 This made sense
because the Deputy already had functional management control over
much of DOJ, whereas the Solicitor General was almost uniquely
focused on the Supreme Court.50
49. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (establishing the Department of Justice);
Acting Attorneys Gen., 8 Op. O.L.C. at 40.
50. See H.R. DOC. NO. 83-130, at 1 (1953) (an April 20, 1953 message from the President to Congress
to accompany transmittal of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953 concerning DOJ) (“Under present law the
Solicitor General is required to exercise the duties of the Attorney General in case of the absence or
disability of the latter, or in case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General. . . . The Solicitor General
is no longer the appropriate officer of the Department of Justice to be first in the line of succession of
officers to be Acting Attorney General. . . . The Department of Justice now has a Deputy Attorney
General, provision for that title having been made in Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950. The duties of
this officer include supervision over all major units of the Department of Justice and over United States
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The second primary effect of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953
was to designate a subsequent line of Senate-confirmed successors to
head DOJ: either the Solicitor General, or one of the assistant attorneys
general, in an order designated by the Attorney General. Thus, apart
from the Vacancies Act, which at the time expressly prohibited any
other person to act as Attorney General, the further order of succession
in this Plan made clear that the office of Attorney General was limited
to only certain Senate-confirmed senior DOJ officers.
But what is often confused or overlooked is a third effect, which
was not so overt. That third effect, which directly followed the transfer
in the order of succession, came from the text: “and for the purposes
of [the first specific section of the contemporaneous Vacancies Act],
the Deputy Attorney General shall be deemed to be the first assistant
of the Department of Justice.”51 Logically, it would not make sense to
have that text be a redundant restatement of the provision at the start
of the same sentence. And indeed, a historical inquiry suggests that
was not necessarily the case.
Reorganization Plan No. 4, like all such plans of the Eisenhower era,
came primarily from the President’s Advisory Committee on
Government Organization (PACGO), chaired by Nelson A.
Rockefeller.52 Documents in President Eisenhower’s and Mr.
Rockefeller’s archives both reveal that the language was meant as a
“provision for the Deputy Attorney General to serve as a general
assistant to the Attorney General” and was separate from the provision
to “act as the head of the Department in his absence.”53 The White
House believed that making the Deputy Attorney General the principal
assistant “for over-all Departmental management and supervision”
would “require legislation.”54 Originally, the recommendation was to
attorneys and marshals. . . . He is, both by title and by the nature of his functions, the officer best situated
to act as the administrative head of the Department of Justice when the Attorney General is absent or
disabled or the office of Attorney General is vacant.” (emphasis added)).
51. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 135.
52. Memorandum from the President’s Advisory Comm. on Governmental Org. to President
Eisenhower (Mar. 14, 1953) [App. at C-4–C-6] [hereinafter PACGO Memo].
53. Id. Both provisions that comprised Recommendation No. 2 within the PACGO Memo would be
inserted into § 1(a) of the Plan and would later be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 508(a). Id.
54. Id. Perhaps this belief came from a reading of the Deputy Attorney General’s statutory authority
at the time, wherein no job function or authorization existed. 5 U.S.C. § 294 (1952).
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simply abolish the statutory provision that made the Solicitor General
act as head of DOJ in case of vacancy. But after review, that approach
was abandoned. Instead, two distinct provisions were inserted: one
having to do with succession and swapping the Deputy Attorney
General for the Solicitor General, and the other designated the Deputy,
as PACGO would summarize, “to serve as general assistant to the
Attorney General.”55
Irrespective of that intent, a legal canon of statutory construction
results in the same end. As will be explained in section III.A.7, the
provision described contained a specific cross-reference—not to the
Vacancies Act of the era as a whole—but to only one specific
provision: the one describing “first assistants.” In such a case, case law
is abundantly clear that a specific cross-reference is not only limited to
the one section (not the rest of the act), but that it is frozen in time and
the referencing statute, here § 508(a), cannot incorporate later
amendments.56 Put more simply, the cross-reference in Plan No. 4,
now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 508(a), only applies to the first section of
the Vacancies Act as it existed in June 1953.
3. 1966–1977: Codification of the Reorganization Plan into 28
U.S.C. § 508
In 1966, Congress enacted and reorganized Title 5 of the U.S. Code
into positive law.57 As part of the massive effort, the 1870 automatic
succession provision—as modified by Reorganization Plan Nos. 2’s
and 4’s designation of a new senior DOJ rank structure—was codified
into its current location at 28 U.S.C. § 508.58 As can be seen by
comparing Figure 2 (Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953) above, to
Figure 3 (the 1966 codification) below, and as the codifiers specifically
and repeatedly stated, the codification statute “made no substantive
55. See PACGO Memo, supra note 52 [App. at C-5].
56. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019) (“[A] statute that refers to another statute by
specific title or section number in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the
referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments.”); see also cases cited infra note 259.
57. Government Organization & Employees, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966).
58. Id. at 612. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 293 (1958) and accompanying notes regarding Reorganization
Plans, with 80 Stat. at 612 (incorporating those notes with existing Code sections in a new codification).
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changes.”59 That is why revision notes accompanying the Code’s
section describe only what were intended to be minor and stylistic
changes.60

Figure 3: The 1966 positive-law codification, which created § 508
within Title 28.
Unfortunately, and as introduced at the outset of this Article, one
such stylistic change made by codifiers—use of the word “may”—has
given some people pause. A proper substitution of the Reorganization
Plans into the 1870 succession provision would have read: “the Deputy
Attorney General shall have power to exercise all the duties of that
office.” But the well-intentioned codifiers, hoping to reduce and
simplify wording, ended that same sentence with “the Deputy Attorney
General may exercise all the duties of that office . . . .”61 Of course,
case law is clear that in event of just such a disparity, the source law

59. H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 182 (1965) (“The purpose of this bill is to restate in comprehensive form,
without substantive change, the statutes in effect before July 1, 1965 . . . . In the revised title 5 simple
language has been substituted for awkward and obsolete terms . . . .”); see also Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank,
F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“No ‘substantive changes’
were intended [in the 1966 recodification].”) (citations omitted); H.R. REP. N O. 89-901, at 3 (“[T]here are
no substantive changes made by this bill . . . . In a codification statute . . . the statute is intended to remain
substantively unchanged. [also listing court cases that ‘affirm this principle’]”).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 182. The Office of Law Revision codifiers, specifically note at the bottom
of today’s § 508, that wording was changed, and that “R.S. § 347 is cited as authority inasmuch as the
function contained therein [authority to act as head of DOJ] was . . . transferred to the Deputy Attorney
General . . . . The word ‘may’ is substituted for ‘have the power.’” 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1966) (prior law
and revision). The explanations appear to have been taken directly from the committee reports
accompanying the codification. S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 203 (1966); H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 184.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 508 (1966).
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controls.62 Consequently, “may” is of no moment. The true law states
that the Deputy Attorney General shall have power to exercise all the
duties of that office in case of vacancy.63
Apart from simplification, the codifiers might have been driven to
include “may” because they had just codified a section relating to the
office of the Deputy Attorney General. As 28 U.S.C. § 504 states: “The
President may appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a Deputy Attorney General.”64 Because that office is elective,
to be filled at the discretion of the President, the word “may” in § 508
might also have been used to align with phrasing in § 504 and with the
possibility the office itself might be vacant.65
Regardless of reason, the true text, “shall have the power,”
automatically vests the same acting powers upon the Deputy Attorney
General just as it did for the Solicitor General. The strongest
supporting evidence of this mandatory and automatically vested
authority comes from President Eisenhower, the provision’s main
author. When he transmitted the Plan to Congress, he sent an
accompanying message that characterized the designated officer as
being “required to exercise the duties of the Attorney General in case
of the absence or disability of the latter, or in case of a vacancy in the
office of Attorney General.”66
62. Source law controls, even over the U.S. Code in the context of a positive-law codification statute.
E.g., United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884) (holding for the Revised Statutes and explaining,
“It will not be inferred that the legislature, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their
policy, unless such intention be clearly expressed.” (citing McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619 (1884)));
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Dep’t of Transp., 479 F.3d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well established
that language revisions in codifications will not be deemed to alter the meaning of the original statute.”);
Joseph v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1155 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the source
statute at law controlled over the same 1966 positive-law codification). Even the codifiers listed several
cases to support their assertion that “[t]he committee wishes to express that in a codification statute . . . the
statute is intended to remain substantively unchanged.” S. REP. NO. 89-1380, at 18–21.
63. See sources cited supra note 12 (noting the use of the same common phrasing in the Constitution
and in statutes).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 504 (2018).
65. The same is historically true for the Associate Attorney General, which was an office added and
elevated in 1977 but which existed since 1973. See Act of Oct. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-139, 91 Stat.
1171, 1171 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 504a); S. REP. NO. 95-429, at 2–3 (1977) (explaining the position of
Associate AG was created by Department and Executive Order, but was not always filled; but given
supervisory demands and a major role in policy, the position needed to be legislatively created and made
subject to confirmation).
66. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-130, at 1 (1953) (emphasis added).
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4. 1977–Present: The Same Succession, but Now with a New
Associate AG
After Congress made the office of Associate Attorney General
official and made its holder the third-ranking officer in DOJ, § 508(b)
was amended to insert the office into the order of succession:
When . . . neither the Acting Attorney General nor the
Deputy Attorney is available . . . the Associate Attorney
General shall act as Attorney General. The Attorney General
may designate the Solicitor General and the Assistant
Attorneys General, in further order of succession, to act as
Attorney General.67
While inserting the new office, the 1977 Congress made clear that it
meant to “continue” the authority of the Attorney General to designate
the remaining order of succession. 68 Thus, while the phrasing “shall
act as” was replaced with “to act as” in the last line, the effect was the
same. Consequently, through all of its iterations, § 508 as a whole
always ensured that a Senate-confirmed DOJ senior officer was
authorized to lead the department immediately.69
In sum, § 508 can only be read as a statute that immediately vests
the power to act as Attorney General in predesignated officers. It is
automatic and does not require the designee to affirmatively accept
those powers. It is also not subject to any other statute. Moreover, as
will be shown, the automatic and specifically designated authorities in
§ 508 are not displaced by FVRA at the discretion of the President.

67. Act of Oct. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-139, 91 Stat. 1171 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 508(b) (2018)).
68. S. REP. NO. 95-429, at 3–4 (“Section 2. — Amends section 508(b) of title 28 to specify that the
Associate Attorney General is authorized to exercise the duties of the office of Attorney General upon the
absence, or disability of the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, or in the event of a vacancy
in those offices. The section also continues the authority of the Attorney General to designate the further
order of succession . . . .”).
69. E.g., Memorandum from President Donald Trump to Matthew George Whitaker, Chief of Staff,
Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 8, 2018) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review). For any
designation other than these automatic authorities, the President historically writes a letter formally
designating a person to perform the duties of another office. Id. Documentation shows this occurred for
Mr. Whitaker. Id.
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B. History of the Vacancies Act of 1868: Always Superseded by
§ 508
As previously and briefly introduced, acts for filling vacancies have
existed in some form since 1792.70 The 1792 act applied only to the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, or any other Senate-confirmed
officer in those departments and allowed the President to appoint any
person to those offices in case of death, absence, or sickness without
any express time limitation.71 The 1795 act did the same, but limited
such authorizations to six months.72 In 1863, the immediate forerunner
to the Vacancies Act expanded that authority to cover any Executive
department, but limited the acting person to a head of an Executive
department or a presidentially appointed officer therein.73
The subsequent version, the Vacancies Act of 1868, was the direct
predecessor to FVRA. 74 In short, that 1868 law repealed all other
vacancy and succession laws before it and wrote on a clean slate.75 The
Vacancies Act stated that “in case of the death, resignation, absence,
or sickness of the head of any Executive department . . . the first or
sole assistant thereof shall . . . perform the duties of such head.”76 That
automatic acting authority was subject to presidential discretion to
authorize and direct any other department head or Senate-confirmed
officer in those departments to perform the duties of the vacant office
for a period of ten days.77

70. E.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281.
71. Id.
72. Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, § 1, 1 Stat. 415, 415.
73. Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, § 1, 12 Stat. 656, 656. Thus, other offices outside of Executive
departments still carried their own office-specific succession statutes, usually contained within an office’s
organic act. E.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 1, 1 Stat. 733, 733 (having an office-specific succession
provision for the Post Office, which did not become an Executive department until 1872).
74. Oversight of the Implementation of the Vacancies Act: Hearing on S. 1764 Before the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings] (“The law was adopted in,
essentially, its current form in 1868 . . . .”). The hearings on S. 1764 were repeatedly referenced in the
Senate Report and influenced a significant part of S. 2176, most of which remained verbatim and became
FVRA. E.g., S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 9 (1998) (referring to the hearings on Mar. 18, 1998).
75. Act of July 28, 1868, ch. 227, § 4, 15 Stat. 168, 169 (“[A]ll acts heretofore passed on the subject
of temporarily supplying vacancies in the executive departments . . . are hereby, repealed.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Only five years later, an odd quirk of history occurred. Until 1873,
federal statutes were amassed as compilations. No enacted statute
explicitly altered the text of a prior one, even when a partial repeal was
explicit. That all changed when Congress authorized the President to
commission three persons “to revise, simplify, arrange, and
consolidate all statutes of the United States.”78 Even more specifically,
those codifiers were given authority to “bring together all statutes and
parts of statutes . . . omitting redundant or obsolete enactments, and
making such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile the
contradictions.”79 It took the codifiers several years, but, finally, in
1874, they codified all laws enacted before December 1, 1873.80
Unlike what we are used to with modern codifiers who are much
more careful and have more limited authority to “remove ambiguities,
contradictions, and other imperfections,”81 the first Revised Statutes
codifiers were given unusual and vast authority to rewrite the texts of
prior acts.82 And it just so happened that between 1868, when the
Vacancies Act was passed, and 1873, when the first codifiers finished
their work, DOJ’s Organic Act and its specific succession provision
was enacted.
Consequently, it was not Congress but rather the first codifiers who
altered the existing Vacancies Act and wrote into it the explicit
exemption for the office of Attorney General:
Sec. 179. In any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding
sections, except the death, resignation, absence, or sickness
of the Attorney General, the President may, in his direction,
78. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 1, 14 Stat. 74, 74.
79. Id. § 2, 14 Stat. at 75.
80. For background on this process, see Margaret Wood, The Revised Statutes of the United States:
Predecessor to the U.S. Code, LIBR . OF CONG. (July 2, 2015), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/07/therevised-statutes-of-the-united-states-predecessor-to-the-u-s-code/ [https://perma.cc/YPF8-7525] and Will
Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t Find in the U.S. Code, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129 (2010),
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss2/2 [https://perma.cc/TU3L-G7L3].
81. 2 U.S.C. § 285b (2018) (describing the duties and authorities of the House’s Office of Law
Revision Counsel).
82. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 113. For an excellent history of the Revised Statutes, see
Ralph H. Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The Federal Statutes—Their History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV.
1008, 1012–14 (1938) (explaining the codification process) (“The 1873 revision is the only occasion on
which Congress has enacted as law a complete revision of all the federal permanent public statutes.”).
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authorize and direct the head of any other Department or any
other officer in either Department, whose appointment is
vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to perform the duties of the vacant
office . . . .83
Under their reconciliation, first assistants would still automatically
take over, but the provision granting the President the discretion to
instead appoint a different Senate-confirmed officer was subject to
only a singular limitation: a president could not fill a vacant office of
Attorney General.
Thus, it was without question by codifiers, in their first careful
incorporation and study of statutes, that the later-enacted and more
specific 1870 DOJ Organic Act—which contained the version of
today’s § 508—superseded and served as an exemption to the catch-all
provisions of the Vacancies Act of 1868.84 Congress enshrined that
construction as official when it codified the Revised Statutes as
positive law,85 and that text remained for well over a century.
Although other specific succession statutes were enacted after that
codification—and they were universally understood to supersede the
Vacancies Act86—none were written into the text of that Act, because
Congress chose never to directly amend that positive law.
83. REV. STAT. § 179 (1873) (emphases added). The provision was the same in the 1873 and 1878
Revised Statutes compilations. Id.; REV. STAT. § 179 (2d ed. 1878).
84. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1163–64 (1868) (statements by Sen. Lyman Trumbell,
the principal sponsor of the Act, indicating the 1868 Vacancies Act was to apply to all vacancies). Recall
that not two years later, Congress passed DOJ’s Organic Act and vested sole acting authority in the
Solicitor General, which would later be given to the Deputy Attorney General. See also, e.g., Act of July
23, 1868, ch. 227, § 2, 15 Stat. 168, 168 (the 1868 Vacancies Act § 2, using phrasing to show exclusivity);
Hearings, supra note 74, at 3 (“[T]he legislative history of 1868 certainly indicated that the Framers
seemed to think that the Vacancies Act was the exclusive means by which appointments were made.”).
85. Act of June 20, 1874 § 2, 18 Stat. 113 (“[T]he revised statutes of the United States . . . when
printed . . . shall be legal evidence of the laws and treaties therein contained, in all the courts of the United
States . . . .”).
86. Even despite the lack of direct affirmation in the text of law, DOJ, OLC, GAO, and even the Senate
recognized that the later-enacted and the more specific office-succession statutes superseded the
Vacancies Act. E.g., Hearings, supra note 74, at 26 (testimony of OLC Special Counsel Daniel Koffsky)
(“In 1868, when Congress first passed the Vacancies Act in essentially its present form, it repealed the
then-existing statutes on filling vacancies. Since 1868, however, Congress has enacted other statutes that,
in our view, apply to vacancies of particular departments or agencies.”); id. at 28–29 (testimony of GAO
Associate General Counsel Joan M. Hollenbach) (“We believe that the application of the Vacancies Act
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Nor would future codifiers ever be granted such broad authorities
again. After numerous errors were later discovered in the first Revised
Statutes,87 Congress limited the discretion of the codifiers for the
second Revised Statutes in 1878, instead instructing them to write
notes in margins for any laws that “may in any manner affect or modify
any provisions of the Revised Statutes.”88 And unlike the first edition
of the Revised Statutes, the second edition was not codified into
can be superseded only if there is specific statutory language providing another means for filling the
particular vacancy in question. We have a number of opinions where we have found such statutory
provisions to exist, and when that type of statutory provision does exist, we have concluded that the
Vacancies Act does not apply . . . we would suggest adding an amendment to explicitly provide that the
Vacancies Act can be superseded only by another statute that provides an alternative means for filling a
specific identified vacancy.”); The Honorable William Proxmire United States Senate, 65 Comp. Gen.
626, 634 (1986) (B-220522, 1986 WL 60691) (“Our interpretation of the [Vacancies] Act has consistently
recognized that its application can only be superseded in the case of statutes that provide specifically for
an alternate means of filling a particular office.” (specifically cited by S. REP. NO. 100-317, at 14 (1988)
“as consistent with the meaning of the Vacancies Act.”)); S. REP. NO. 100-317, at 14 (“The exclusive
authority of the Vacancies Act would only be overcome by specific statutory language providing some
other means for filling vacancies.”); Status of the Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 1 Op. O.L.C.
287, 287 (1977) (explaining that the Vacancies Act is not applicable to the office of Director of OMB in
light of the specific statutory authority providing for the filling of the specific position); see also, e.g.,
Transcripts from S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Business Meeting (June 17, 1998) [App. at A-75]
[hereinafter Transcript of June 17th GAC Meeting] (“[I]n our wisdom, Congress has over the years
exempted a number of positions, as you indicated earlier, from the Vacancies Act by providing a specific
way to designate a replacement.”); Guidance on Application of Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23
Op. O.L.C. 60, 61–63 (1999) (stating that the list of 40-some statutes in the Senate Report “continue to
apply to filling certain vacant PAS positions” and characterizing this as a “continued” practice several
other times in its guidance). Even the current Attorney General, William Barr, agreed with this take when
he was an Assistant Attorney General at OLC. See Application of Vacancy Act Limitations to Presidential
Designation of an Acting Special Counsel, 13 Op. O.L.C. 144, 145 (1989)); see also Restructuring the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 285–97 (1978) [App. at B-5–B-15] (excerpting letter from OLC that said:
“In its January 10 letter the Department took the position that the specific vacancy provisions relating to
the Department of Justice prevail over the earlier and more general language of the Vacancies Act (5
U.S.C. §§ 3346–3349).”); id. (“It is our view that legislation, such as 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, is to be
construed, not as being subordinated to the Vacancies Act, but as remedial legislation designed to
supersede it.”); id. (“Of the eleven Executive departments, . . . five additional ones have acting officer
provisions like 28 U.S.C. § 508 in their organic legislation . . . Consequently, the thirty-day provision of
5 U.S.C. 3348 is inapplicable to the acting heads of six out of the eleven Executive departments.” (quote
from a letter by Mr. Dixon of OLC, to which Mr. Barr referred in his 1989 OLC opinion)). Even DOJ’s
own regulations as to the succession to the office of Attorney General do not reference any Vacancies Act
at all; however, the regulations do expressly mention § 508, DOJ’s office-specific statute, and rely on it
for the regulation’s authority. 28 C.F.R. § 0.137 (2019). The regulation does not read as if the § 508
succession orders are optional or able to be displaced. Id.
87. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 82, at 1014 (describing that 259 errors were later discovered and how
Congress was reluctant to enact a law making such codifications the actual law in the future).
88. Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. 82, § 2, 19 Stat. 268, 268. The second Revised Statutes would be the last
codification project for many years.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/4

26

Migala: The Vacancies Act and an Acting Attorney General

2020]

THE VACANCIES ACT

725

positive law and was only considered prima facie evidence of the
law.89 The same was true for the first edition of the U.S. Code in 1926,
whose authorizing law stated the following in a preface: “nothing in
this Act shall be construed as repealing or amending any [] law.”90
More simply put, the codifiers that wrote in the explicit exemption for
the office of the Attorney General were the only ones in history given
such authority. That they happened to be granted, and used, that
authority only a few years after the Vacancies Act of 1868 was a
chance quirk of history.
Still, the effect of that history was that the explicit exemption for the
office of the Attorney General became source law. And even when the
provision was subsequently codified into positive law in Title 5 of the
U.S. Code in 1966, it remained substantively unchanged91: “This
section does not apply to a vacancy in the office of Attorney
General.”92 The provision would continue unaffected until 1998, when
FVRA was enacted.93
Before moving on to explore the odd history of FVRA, how the
explicit exemption remained in the draft versions of FVRA, and why
it was removed, remember this take away: the sole explicit exemption
to the Vacancies Act, which kept a president from appointing anyone
else to act as Attorney General, lasted for at least 125 years.94

89. Wood, supra note 80.
90. Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, § 2, 44 Stat. 1, 1.
91. The codification of the Title intended no substantive changes in law. H.R. REP. NO. 89-901, at 1
(1965); see also supra text accompanying note 59. According to at least one researcher, the reason
Congress limited the Vacancies Act to exclude the specific position of Acting Attorney General was to
ensure that a president could not choose someone from outside the department who might skew the
positions of the Justice Department during their temporary installation. Hearings, supra note 74, at 41
(statement of CRS specialist Morton Rosenberg).
92. Government Organization and Employees, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 3347, 80 Stat. 378, 426 (1966).
93. In 1998, Congress amended the Vacancies Act to expand the scope of § 3345 from Executive
departments to Executive agencies, and it extended the time limits to 120-day periods, with certain
possible extensions. Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-398, § 7, 102 Stat. 985,
988 (1988).
94. The long-standing practice and understanding gives great deference in any subsequent issue of
statutory construction. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 533 (2014) (“And three-quarters
of a century of settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper
interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.” (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
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C. FVRA: Context and Comparison from Draft Bill to Enacted
Law
What drove Congress to amend the Vacancies Act and pass FVRA
in 1998 had absolutely nothing to do with the position of Attorney
General. In fact, not one discussion, question, or point of any kind was
ever raised to suggest Congress wanted to make a dramatic change to
the well-established practice and explicit text exempting the office of
Attorney General. Instead, the focus of the new law was aimed at DOJ,
but only with respect to its take on acting appointments to lower-level
offices through vesting and delegation statutes like 28 U.S.C. §§ 509
and 510, otherwise known as “housekeeping statutes.”95
As the contemporary 1998 report from the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) recounts, the main appointment that spurred FVRA was
the Attorney General’s designation of Mr. Bill Lann Lee to the position
of Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.96 Mr. Lee was
nominated by the President to the position in July 1997, but his
nomination was returned in November.97 The next month, in
December 1997, using authorities in 28 U.S.C. §§ 509 and 510, the
Attorney General functionally appointed Mr. Lee to act in the same
position.98 While Mr. Lee was acting in the position, the President
again formally nominated him to the same position.99 However, the
Senate would never confirm him. Mr. Lee ultimately served for nearly

95. Stephen Migala, The Vacancies Act and a Post-Vacancy First Assistant of USCIS 6–13,
section II.B (Sept. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Migala, Vacancies Act II] (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3450843 (describing in more detail the use of housekeeping statutes as
the main impetus for FVRA). This author has written three articles on different aspects of and
controversies over FVRA. This Article is the first. The one just cited in this note is the second; it analyzed
whether a first assistant installed after a vacancy already occurred could act in that vacant office. And the
third article discusses FVRA’s enforcement mechanism in § 3348. See Stephen Migala, The Vacancies
Act and Its Anti-Ratification Provision (Nov. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Migala, Vacancies Act III]
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3486687.
96. ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 1; see also S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 3 (1998) (part on “Need for
Legislation”). Even the Government fully acknowledges that Senate circumvention via housekeeping
statutes was the impetus for and target of FVRA. E.g., Brief for the Petitioner at *6–10, NLRB v. SW
Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) (No. 15-1251), 2016 WL 4363344.
97. Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Cong. Research Serv., on Validity of Designation of Bill
Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights 10–11 (Jan. 14, 1998).
98. Id.
99. Migala, Vacancies Act II, supra note 95, at 12.
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three years in the position, based on unlimited-time authorities in
§§ 509 and 510.100
That sidestep drew the ire of Congress, and Senators Thompson,
Thurmond, and Byrd in particular.101 But it was not the only such
example of evasion.102 As the CRS report notes, in 1998 alone, the
same year that FVRA was enacted, around 20% of main Executive
department PAS positions were being filled by temporary designees,
many of whom exceeded the Vacancies Act 120-day time limit.103
Some members of Congress, as well as the Comptroller General,
believed that such use of “housekeeping statutes” like §§ 509 and 510
constituted an improper avoidance of both the Vacancies Act and of
the Constitution’s Appointment Clause.104 But DOJ took the opposite
view and continued to use the broad and non-time-limited authority
from its housekeeping statutes.105
100. ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 3. Eventually, the President used a recess appointment to more
officially appoint Mr. Lee in August 2000. See Christopher Marquis, Clinton Sidesteps Senate to Fill Civil
Rights Enforcement Job, N.Y. Times (Aug. 4, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/04/us/clintonsidesteps-senate-to-fill-civil-rights-enforcement-job.html [https://perma.cc/LTW8-WH68].
101. Thompson Says Justice Department “In Flagrant Violation of Law,” U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
HOMELAND
SECURITY
&
GOVERNMENTAL
AFF.
(Mar.
18,
1998),
ON
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/thompson-says-justice-department-in-flagrantviolation-of-law [https://perma.cc/2KZM-KV7Q] [hereinafter Thompson Statement] (“What we’re
talking about today is where people who are running the government in positions which should be filled
with the advice and consent of the Senate are never approved by the Senate. . . . The current situation cries
out for oversight, and it now demands action. Senators Byrd and Thurmond, two of our witnesses today,
have introduced legislation recently which would address this long-standing problem.”).
102. DOJ often used this sidestep. Apart from Mr. Lee, the Attorney General designated Walter
Dellinger to act as Solicitor General and Seth P. Waxman to act as Deputy Attorney General. OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GEN., DESIGNATION ORDER 2038-96, DESIGNATING WALTER DILLINGER AS ACTING
SOLICITOR GENERAL (1996) [App. at A-120]; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., DESIGNATION ORDER,
DESIGNATING SETH P. WAXMAN AS ACTING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL (1997) [App. at A-121]. Mr.
Dellinger served for over sixteen months, until Seth Waxman was confirmed and took his oath sometime
after November 7, 1997. PN660—Seth Waxman—Department of Justice, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/nomination/105th-congress/660? [https://perma.cc/BPZ7-W799] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2019).
103. ROSENBERG, supra note 29. “Main” is qualified here because some PAS offices like U.S.
Attorneys and Ambassadors were not surveyed; only the highest PAS offices in departments were
surveyed, which totaled 320 in all.
104. Id.; see also, e.g., 65 Comp. Gen. 626, 631–33 (1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-317, at 14 (1988)),
https://www.gao.gov/products/422205 [https://perma.cc/PPH9-W75V].
105. E.g., Hearings, supra note 74, at 25–28 (testimony of Principal Deputy Associate Attorney
General Joseph Onek) (“Since 1868, however, Congress has enacted other statutes that, in our view, apply
to vacancies of particular departments or agencies. . . . [W]e believe that the Attorney General has ample
authority, outside the Vacancies Act, to provide for the temporary discharge of duties of Department
officers when their positions become vacant.”); Application of Vacancy Act Limitations to Presidential
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DOJ’s position from at least 1973 to 1998 was the same one taken
in this Article and which DOJ has since abruptly abandoned: that a
later enacted and more specific statute controlled. This same position
followed basic canons of statutory construction and was used by DOJ
to argue that its 1950-enacted,106 department-specific housekeeping
statutes superseded the 1868-enacted and broader Vacancies Act. 107
Separately, DOJ also properly refuted an argument advanced by
many in the Senate: that when Congress amended the Vacancies Act
in 1988, clear legislative intent as to its exclusivity was evinced in the
accompanying Senate report, which stated, “The exclusive authority
of the Vacancies Act would only be overcome by specific statutory
language providing some other means for filling vacancies.”108 That
clear expression of intent was dismissed by OLC as a committee
improperly altering the construction of a statute through subsequent
legislative history. OLC’s argument was in fact supported by case law,
and even somewhat persuasive, because the 1988 amendments did not
affect then-§ 3349, which dealt with the act’s exclusivity.109
But much of the Senate still firmly disagreed with DOJ’s arguments,
agreeing instead with the Comptroller General and believing that the
1988 Senate Report accompanying the Vacancies Act amendments
evinced an authoritative indication of how to construe the law.110
Designation of an Acting Special Counsel, 13 Op. O.L.C. 144, 145 (1989).
106. Though DOJ’s vesting (§ 509) and delegation (§ 510) statutes were enacted through
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, the Attorney General had prior authority to delegate general duties
within DOJ, as its Organic Act provided. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 14, 16 Stat. 162, 164. This
Article takes no position on whether specific duties statutorily assigned to specific offices after 1870 could
in fact be delegated under that 1870 authority prior to 1950.
107. E.g., Letter from Robert Dixon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Senator
Roman Hruska (Mar. 13, 1973) [App. at B-15] (“The Comptroller General’s conclusion that the Vacancies
Act must prevail over all subsequent and specific statutes disregards conventional principles of statutory
construction.”); Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, to
Senator Strom Thurmond (July 10, 1997) [App. at A-115]; Memorandum from John Harmon, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., (Feb. 27, 1978) [App. at B-8] (“If the
authority of a person to perform the functions of the bead of an agency can be based on two grounds—the
general provision of [the Vacancies Act] and a special one, such as the [agency’s specific delegation
statute] here involved—the special source of authority prevails.”).
108. S. REP. NO. 100-317, at 14.
109. Application of Vacancy Act Limitations to Presidential Designation of an Acting Special Counsel,
13 Op. O.L.C. at 145.
110. E.g., S. Res. 128, 105th Cong. (1997), https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/sres128/BILLS105sres128is.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7Q8-SAUU]; 144 CONG. REC. S6416 (daily ed. June 16, 1998),
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Unable to dissuade DOJ, and noting that other agencies were also
making appointments through their own housekeeping statutes,
members of the Senate took steps towards a new law to prevent what
in their view was DOJ circumventing the statute and the Constitution’s
Appointment Clause.111 Those efforts began with Senate bill 1764,112
the first draft of what would later become FVRA.
S. 1764, authored by Senator Strom Thurmond, served as a model
for the basic structure of FVRA.113 Notably, confirming that the true
target of FVRA was housekeeping statutes, the explicit exemption for
the office of Attorney General was in fact included in S. 1764. But
what the bill did differently is structure a new draft-§ 3347 to require
that the law would be universally applicable to vacancies in all PAS
offices, and exempted them only if “another statutory provision
expressly provides that such provision supersedes [the Vacancies
Act]” or if the “President makes an appointment to fill a vacancy in
such office during a recess of the Senate.”114 Thus, S. 1764 was written
in a way to catch all other PAS office successions and only make three
exceptions: statutes with an express-statement requirement, a
constitutional recess appointment, or for the office of Attorney
General. Clearly, Senator Thurmond did not want to target § 508 and
intended to keep that succession order unaffected.

https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/06/16/CREC-1998-06-16-pt1-PgS6405-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59QA-D5YF] (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond explaining the DOJ impetus for
cosponsoring the FVRA bill); 143 CONG. REC. S10,068 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1997),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1997/09/26/CREC-1997-09-26-pt1-PgS10068.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZHF6-ATTS] (introducing S. Res. 128 and providing statements as to why).
111. Hearings, supra note 74, at 1–5; see also, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S6416 (daily ed. June 16, 1998),
(statement of Sen. Fred Thompson introducing FVRA) (“The bill preserves those [existing office-specific
succession] statutes, but, to clearly reject the position of the Justice Department, it expressly repudiates
the contention that a law authorizing the head of a department to delegate or reassign duties among other
officers is a statute that provides for the temporary filling of a specific office.”).
112. S. 1764, 105th Cong. (1998) (as introduced in the Senate on Mar. 16, 1998),
https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s1764/BILLS-105s1764is.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2MH-8YE3].
113. Compare
id.,
with
S.
2176,
105th
Cong.
(1998),
https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s2176/BILLS-105s2176is.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DNA2-7RWE]
(similar structure and phrasings); see also Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson
(Apr. 24, 1998) [App. at A-8] (handwriting in the margins of the first draft of S. 2176 reading, “This
follows the Thurmond bill format.”).
114. S. 1764.
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During hearings on S. 1764, an associate general counsel of the
GAO, who served under the Comptroller General, noted that the bill
had a broad catch all and unnecessarily superseded other
office-specific statutes.115 The GAO counsel offered three suggestions
to improve the bill, each of which would be incorporated into the next
version of the bill.116 The most relevant one was: “we would suggest
adding an amendment to explicitly provide that the Vacancies Act can
be superseded only by another statute that provides an alternative
means for filling a specific identified vacancy.”117
After considering recommendations from hearings on S. 1764, and
after working with Democratic staff on the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee (GAC), GAC’s chairman, Senator Fred Thompson,
used much of S. 1764 to write and then introduce Senate bill 2176 in
June 1998.118
Like S. 1764 before it, S. 2176’s clear purpose was to put more
officials through the Senate’s advice-and-consent process, not less. To
enable that goal, the bill proposed several changes to the existing law.
Most either directly targeted the housekeeping statutes or fixed
systemic reasons used to justify why such Senate-evading
appointments were necessary.
For one, to allow more time for the Senate to handle the larger load
of PAS positions in an expanding federal government, which today has
around 1,242 PAS positions,119 the bill extended the time designees
could act in an office.
The bill also expanded the types of vacancies that would qualify
under the act to include any reason why the officeholder “is otherwise
unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.”120 This new,
broader term was added specifically in response to a D.C. Circuit

115. Hearings, supra note 74, at 29, 152 (testimony of GAO Associate General Counsel Joan M.
Hollenbach).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 29; see also id. at 154 (similarly stating).
118. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 113 [App. at A-1, A-8].
119. See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV. AFFAIRS, 114TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORTING
POSITIONS 114–26 (Comm. Print 2016) (known best as the “Plumbook”).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a); S. 2176, 105th Cong. (1998).
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ruling that limited the scope of the Vacancies Act of 1868.121
Accordingly, because that same wording remained in the enacted law,
FVRA now applies to more officials and any kind of vacancy,
including those created by firing or removal.122
Another change directly targeted the provisions that allowed Mr.
Lee to act in office for so long. The bill aimed to “create a clear and
exclusive process”123 for filling PAS office vacancies and crafted
“catch-all” provisions to ensure that DOJ and others could no longer
argue that housekeeping statutes like §§ 509 and 510 could be used in
lieu of the act.124
S. 2176 passed the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on
June 17, 1998, and was reported to the Senate on July 15, 1998.125 It
was a well-researched bill and came with a detailed committee report
further explaining its provisions.126 Unfortunately, the bill was not
acted upon by the fifty-five-seat Republican Senate majority because
it could not gather the three-fifths support needed to overcome a
filibuster, receiving only one Democratic vote from Senator Byrd.127
Instead, negotiations continued, and after amendments and
concessions to the White House and after significant efforts from
Senator Byrd,128 the draft bill passed in a different form as part of the
121. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1998); S.
REP. NO. 105-250, at 12 (1998).
122. E.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12,823 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/
10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHZ6-TQXE] (statements of Sen. Fred
Thompson and Sen. Robert Byrd) (stating it was meant “to cover all situations,” it was meant to
specifically overrule a D.C. Circuit opinion in Doolin, and it would include, among other things, being
fired or put in jail).
123. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 1.
124. Id. at 17; 144 CONG. REC. S12,823–24 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (“[I]n an effort to squarely address
past problems, the Act specifically prohibits the use of general, ‘housekeeping’ statutes as a basis for
circumventing the Vacancies Act. Provisions such as, but not limited to, 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, which
vest all functions of the Department of Justice in the Attorney General and allow the Attorney General to
delegate responsibility for carrying out those functions, shall not be construed as providing an alternative
means of filling vacancies.”).
125. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 1, 10–11.
126. See generally id.
127. 144 CONG. REC. S11,039 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/crec/
1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28-pt1-PgS11021.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQC2-XCYD] (vote on cloture
53-38); Rosenberg Memorandum, supra note 97, at 8.
128. Memorandum from Laurie Rubenstein to Senator Joe Lieberman (Oct. 21, 1998) [App. at A-114]
(“After extensive negotiations, significant concessions to the Administration and a big, personal push by
Senator Byrd, the Vacancies Reform Act was included in the Omnibus Appropriations bill.”).
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large Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999 on the last day of the Senate’s term. FVRA
was enacted as Public Law No. 105-277 (112 Stat. 2681-611) on that
same day, October 21, 1998, and now sits at 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq.
III. Analysis
With plain text, context, and history in mind, the root issue can now
be intelligently analyzed: Does FVRA allow for either it or another
office-specific succession statute to be used electively at the
Executive’s discretion—or does only the office-specific statute, in this
case § 508, control?
The OLC, and DOJ as a whole, agrees that FVRA did not
“extinguish the authority” of § 508.129 But they argue that FVRA was
intended to coexist with such statutes and function as an alternative
mechanism for addressing vacancies.130 In other words, both § 508 and
FVRA are available for use at the discretion of the President, according
to OLC.
OLC presents five principal reasons for its view: (1) that the term
“exclusive” in FVRA’s § 3347(a) means that the categories of statutes
identified therein are rendered non-exclusive and that they or FVRA
can be used;131 (2) that legislative history clearly supports such a
view;132 (3) that the two statutes (FVRA and § 508) can coexist and
thus do not conflict;133 (4) that the removal of the explicit exemption
language specific to the office of Attorney General shows an intent to

129. Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. 208, 208 (2007).
130. See Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 4 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download [https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY]; Designating an
Acting Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., 41 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 4 (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1085611/download [https://perma.cc/KZ5U-YYQG]; Authority of the
President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. at 208; Designation of Acting Dir. of the
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121 (2003).
131. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 5–6; Designating an Acting Dir.
of the Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., 41 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2; Authority of the President to Name an
Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. at 209; Designation of Acting Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
27 Op. O.L.C. at 121 & n.1.
132. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 6; Designation of Acting Dir. of
the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. at 121 & n.1.
133. Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. at 210 n.3.
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make FVRA applicable to that office;134 and (5) that if the office of
Attorney General was meant to be exempted, it would have been
included in § 3349c, which excluded certain multimember and
independent agencies.135
History and analysis will address and dispel each of these arguments
below. For now, note OLC’s strong reliance on FVRA’s intent,
structure, and legislative history as a whole to justify its own position
in light of an ambiguous statutory text. Also, as the legislative history
is recounted more completely below, observe how narrowly OLC
limited its examination of that history, what it selectively seized as
justification, and what other clear signs to the contrary were ignored.
A. Differences Between the Draft Bill and the Enacted FVRA, and
OLC’s Arguments
To understand what FVRA intended to accomplish, a few points
within, and some differences between, its draft-bill versions and its
later-enacted version are important to note.
First and foremost, it must be understood that while the sole and
explicit exemption for § 508 was removed, FVRA functioned to
grandfather and exempt far more office-specific succession statutes
than just § 508. Substantial evidence from legislative history will be
shown to support such a plain-text reading. As this evidence is
introduced, consider how redundant and confusing it would have been
if the only explicit office-specific exemption to FVRA, for § 508,
would have remained alongside a broader categorical exemption for
office-specific succession statutes that had the same effect. Would
future readers and courts be confused and unnecessarily read in some
sort of a difference between the two provisions?
Importantly, even more can be learned from the omission of the
§ 508 exemption in FVRA. The very fact that it was viewed as
redundant shows that lawmakers thought that the broader categorical
description in § 3347(a)(1) would be controlling, just as § 508 was. Of
134. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 7 n.5; Authority of the President
to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. at 209 n.1.
135. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 7 n.5.

Published by Reading Room, 2020

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

734

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

course, that intent was not any dramatic new change, it was simply an
explicit continuance of the way those later-enacted and more specific
statutes were already thought to supersede the Vacancies Act.136 DOJ,
GAO, the Senate, and others were in agreement on that point—and
there was no reason to disturb it. Put another way, § 508 and the order
of succession to Attorney General remained exempted in just the same
way it had always been in the Vacancies Act since 1873. The only
change was that more office-specific succession statutes were, for the
first time, explicitly included in FVRA text via the categorical
exemption.
Next, a look at the structure of FVRA will affirm that the location
of the categorical exemption is far more consistent with having those
office-specific statutes control. Separately, an examination of OLC’s
argument that § 3349c is the only location for specific excluded offices
will show why that cannot be true.
Finally, an analysis will show that OLC’s interpretation of the term
“exclusive” in § 3347 stretches far beyond not only a plain-text
reading, but also well beyond what was clearly intended by Congress.
“Exclusive” was not meant to offer an alternative choice between
statutes—it was only used to ensure that DOJ could not again justify
reading an exception to the new Vacancies Act for housekeeping
statutes.
1. The Agreement to Retain Prior Statutes that Filled Vacancies
The beginnings of the bill that would become FVRA started after
the Senate GAC’s March 1998 hearings on Senator Thurmond’s bill.
Utilizing that bill as a template, taking into account what was learned
at the hearings, and also attempting to incorporate elements of Senator
Byrd’s bill, Senator Thompson and GAC’s Chief Counsel, Fred
Ansell, wrote the initial draft of S. 2176 on April 24, 1998.137

136. See sources cited supra note 86.
137. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 113 [App. at A-1, A-10].
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Figure 4: Excerpt from a staff draft of S. 2176 within a Memorandum
from Fred Ansell to Senator Thompson (Apr. 24, 1998) [App. at A-1,
A-10].
That initial draft, partly reproduced above in Figure 4, would have
overridden all prior succession statutes. The draft also would have
attempted to exempt only one category of statutes: future-enacted
statutes that expressly state they supersede the Vacancies Act.
Soon thereafter, in May 1998, Senator Thompson and Mr. Ansell
involved Democratic GAC Senators and their staffs to work together
on the bill and make it bipartisan.138 The key staffer for the Democratic
GAC Senators in the minority was David Plocher. Mr. Plocher
circulated a memo on May 14, 1998, to the Democratic Ranking
Member on GAC, Senator John Glenn, summarizing the draft bill and
suggesting changes.139 One of those summaries and suggestions stated:
“We want the Act to have exclusive authority over agencies, but we
138. Memorandum from David Plocher et al. to Senator Glenn (May 14, 1998) [App. at A-16–A-17].
139. Id.
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have no reason to override other laws. We should accept other statutes
that already provide for the filling of vacancies.”140

Figure 5: An excerpt from Page 2 of a Memorandum from David
Plocher et al. to Senator Glenn, re: Vacancies Act – GAC Mark-up
(May 14, 1998) [App. at A-16–A-17].
Senator Glenn agreed, and by June 1, 1998, Senator Byrd and his staff
were also on board with his proposal to “retain and not override the
forty succession statutes.”141

140. Id. [App. at A-17]; see also id. [App. at A-18] (“[W]e need the Act to have exclusive authority
over temporary appointments, unless Congress puts into law another procedure for some office.”).
141. Memorandum from Peter Kiefhaber & Paul Weinberger to Senator Robert Byrd (June 1, 1998)
[App. at A-23, A-25].
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Figure 6: Excerpts from a Memorandum from Peter Kiefhaber and
Paul Weinberger to Senator Byrd (June 1, 1998) [App. at A-23, A-26].
When Senator Thompson was ready to bring his bill before his
committee, he arranged a meeting between himself, Senator Glenn,
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and both of their staffs to work out key issues.142 On June 2, 1998, in
advance of that arranged meeting, Mr. Plocher summarized the issues
to be reconciled. Among them was the exclusivity of the law.143 The
Democrats’ proposal was that “the Act should control unless another
law provides a specific means for filling the vacancy.”144

Figure 7: Excerpts of a memo from minority GAC Counsel to Senator
Glenn (June 2, 1998) [App. at A-28, A-30–A-31].
By June 4, 1998, GAC Chief Counsel Fred Ansell recommended to
Senator Thompson that he accept the proposal, especially after
learning that Senator Thurmond wanted automatic succession
provisions affecting the military “to survive any overall Vacancies Act

142. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson (May 22, 1998) (on file with the
Georgia State University Law Review) (a staff memo suggesting that Senator Thompson seek a meeting
with Ranking Member Senator “Glenn to determine what bill to amend the Vacancies Act that he would
support . . . after the recess [which would end June 1].”); Memorandum from Debbie Lehrich to
Democratic Staff (June 5, 1998) [App. at A-53].
143. Memorandum from David Plocher & Debbie Lehrich to Senator John Glenn (June 2, 1998) [App.
at A-30–A-31]; Memorandum from David Plocher et al. to Senator Glenn, supra note 138.
144. Id.
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revision.”145 Mr. Ansell also recommended that to reach an overall
deal, a point of compromise needed to be made to “preserve the prior
statutes that provide for acting officials in specific cases, but one that
said that a law that gives the head of the department the ability to
delegate and assign duties to subordinates does not override the
Vacancies Act.”146

Figure 8: Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Thompson [App.
at A-43].
A Democratic staff memo, written just ahead of the meeting and
dated June 5, read: “Major Issues—that we should be able to agree
on. . . . We should not override other laws already passed by Congress
that have temporary appointment procedures. We should ‘grandfather’

145. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson (June 4, 1998) [App. at A-44].
146. Id.
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existing laws that have specific provisions for filling vacancies and
make the Vacancies Act exclusive from now on.”147
As expected by both sides, the June 5 meeting resulted in agreement
on the issue of the prior statutes.148 In describing the outcome of that
meeting, staffers for both the majority and minority confirmed that a
consensus was reached.149 GAC Chief Counsel Fred Ansell echoed
this point of agreement to Senator Thompson in a later memo: “As you
discussed with Sen. Glenn, the prior existing statutes for interim filling
of specific positions are retained.”150

Figure 9: An update memo from the GAC Chief Counsel to Senator
Thompson [App. at A-56, A-57].
Significantly, in that June 11 memo by Mr. Ansell, the same term
“retained” that was used to describe prior statutes in § 3347 was also
used to describe another section of the bill § 3349b: “The holdover
provisions that govern the interim service for these officials are

147. Memorandum from David Plocher on Vacancy Act Talking Points (June 5, 1998) [App. at
A-51–A-52].
148. Memorandum from Debbie Lehrich to Democratic Staff (June 5, 1998) [App. at A-53].
149. Id.
150. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson (June 11, 1998) [App. at A-57].
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retained.”151 Even from that time, and all the way through enactment,
the section of the bill Mr. Ansell was describing as “retained,”
§ 3349b, did not relevantly change: “[FVRA] shall not be construed to
affect any statute that [meets a certain description].”152 Clearly then,
“retained” meant, at the very least, not affected by FVRA.153
This description of “retained” is highly relevant to how the staff,
Senate, and all of Congress understood the effect of FVRA and what
the original June 5 agreement intended to accomplish. From the June
11 memo, and the reference to the other sections whose text even more
clearly exempted certain statutes of FVRA, it is clear that “retained”154
was understood to mean preserved, grandfathered, and exempted,
which were also used interchangeably by other Senators and staff.155
Moreover, as seen above, in all of the agreements and negotiations on
that point, there was not so much as even a hint that FVRA might
function as an alternative to any of the “retained” statutes.
All told, the agreement by both the Chairman and Ranking Member
of GAC and their staffs to preserve and grandfather certain statutes
resulted in what would later be enacted as § 3347(a)(1)(A). The

151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Compare S. 2176, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998), https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s2176/BILLS105s2176is.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNA2-7RWE], with 5 U.S.C. § 3349b (2018) (no change in excerpted
text).
153. It also puts away DOJ’s structural argument that only § 3349c lists excluded offices and that
because the Attorney General was not among those listed, it was not exempted.
154. Cf. Retained, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/retained
[https://perma.cc/95XD-7ZD6] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) (“to keep in possession or use”).
155. An undated memorandum was found in the archives of Senator Thompson that further supports
the understanding of the “retained” statutes as solely controlling. The memo, found paginated after and
stapled to Senator Thompson’s remarks for the Senate’s September 28, 1998 cloture vote on FVRA,
refuted talking points provided by the White House around July 28, 1998, that opposed the FVRA bill.
See infra note 310. Presumably written by the same staffer that authored FVRA, Fred Ansell, the memo
stated:
The bill would not affect positions of national importance, such as national security,
health and safety, financial stability, or law enforcement. The bill retains the operation
of statutes Congress has passed that govern vacancies in particular positions of this
sort. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and United States attorneys, for example,
will not be covered by this bill.
Responses to Administration Talking Points (1998) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review). Thus, even as late as September 1998, the principal authors of FVRA stated that the FVRA
would not “cover” office-specific succession statutes, which were at the same time still described as
“retained.”
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agreement resulted in subsections (a)(2) and (b), as shown below with
additions to the contemporaneous draft in italics:
§ 3347. Application
Ø Sections 3345 and 3346 are applicable to any
office . . . unless—
(1) another statutory provision expressly provides that
such provision supersedes sections 3345 and 3346;
(2) a statutory provision in effect on the date of
enactment of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of
1998 expressly authorizes the President, or the head
of an Executive department, to designate an officer
to perform the functions and duties of a specified
office temporarily in an acting capacity; or
(3) the President makes an appointment to fill a vacancy
in such office during the recess of the Senate
pursuant to clause 3 of section 2 of article II of the
United States Constitution.
(b) Any statutory provision providing general authority to
the head of an Executive agency . . . to delegate duties
to, or to reassign duties among, officers or employees of
such Executive agency, is not a statutory provision to
which subsection (a)(2) applies.156
Senator Thomson first formally introduced this version to the Senate
and GAC as S. 2176 on June 16, 1998.157 In describing the bill in an
introductory floor statement to the Senate, Senator Thompson affirmed
that the intent was to “preserve” the “laws already on the books that
156. S. 2176 (as introduced in the Senate on June 16, 1998).
157. Id.
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provide a process by which persons can serve as acting officers when
particular offices are vacant.”158
With this context, see how the whole section essentially read at the
time:
•

FVRA is applicable, unless a certain prior succession statute
exists.

Under that presentation and plain-text reading, it is entirely clear that
FVRA is inapplicable when another statute already exists. That was
what Senators were introduced to and that was what they voted on.
And that necessary understanding of FVRA’s inapplicability was
confirmed by other senators, staffs, written summaries on the
agreement, and even the statements of the bill’s author on the Senate
floor describing what the draft § 3347 would do.159
Note, too, the context and structure of what else was inapplicable
within that same § 3347: (1) a later-enacted statute that expressly states
it supersedes FVRA, and (3) a recess appointment. No reasonable
person would think that FVRA could be used as an alternative when
an express prohibition would be enacted in a future statute, as in draft
paragraph (1). Indeed, Senator Thompson himself described that
paragraph as “overriding” his law.160 And it would be a non-starter that
via paragraph (3), Congress would be able to displace the Constitution
and render its text on recess appointments meaningless. But
sandwiched right in the middle of those two clearly superseding or

158. 144 CONG. REC. S6414 (daily ed. June 16, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/1998/06/16/CREC-1998-06-16-pt1-PgS6405-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLS2-K2CU] (Sen. Fred
Thompson’s introductory statement on S. 2176, stating: “Nonetheless, we do not write on a clean slate.
There are a number of laws already on the books that provide a process by which persons can serve as
acting officers when particular offices are vacant. In most instances, these officials can serve until a
successor is confirmed, without regard to the Vacancies Act. The bill preserves those specific statutes,
but, to clearly reject the position of the Justice Department, it expressly repudiates the contention that a
law authorizing the head of a department to delegate or reassign duties among other officers is a statute
that provides for the temporary filling of a specific office.” (emphases added)).
159. Id.
160. 144 CONG. REC. S6414 (daily ed. June 16, 1998) (“For the future, Congress will have to expressly
provide that it is superseding the Vacancies Act if it wishes to override the Vacancies Act as to the
temporary filling of advise [sic] and consent provisions.”).
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“overriding” provisions was paragraph (2): the agreed-upon category
of preserved statutes.
Consequently, as the agreement to preserve certain succession
statutes was first written in S. 2176 as introduced, no reasonable
senator would ever believe that FVRA could ever be used as an
alternative to any of those options. Moreover, such an alternative
would have marked a dramatic shift from the prior practice. And, as a
giant change, that elephant would have attracted at least some
discussion.161 Instead, there is absolutely no evidence that Congress
thought that was what it considered.
2. Adding Another Broad Exemption in § 3347 to Cover § 508
and Similar Laws
The first formally introduced version of S. 2176 implemented a
consensus by all sides to preserve and grandfather existing succession
statutes, such as the ones affecting military succession statutes that
Senator Thurmond and others wanted preserved.162
But soon after that bill was viewed by GAC Democratic staff, they
noticed that the language did not exempt certain types of statutes both
sides agreed to keep as controlling. To fix what was called a “flaw”
and a “drafting oversight rather than an intentional decision on Senator
Thompson’s part,” GAC counsel Laurie Rubenstein explained the
situation to Senator Lieberman, and he agreed to offer an amendment
to ensure that the law would “grandfather the many provisions that
themselves designate an acting officer (rather than authorizing the
President and agency head to do so).”163

161. E.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626–27 (2018) (“[T]he usual rule [is] that
Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” (quoting Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001))).
162. S. 2176 (as introduced in the Senate on June 16, 1998).
163. Memorandum from Laurie Rubenstein to Senator Lieberman (June 16, 1998) [App. at A-65].
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Figure 10: Memorandum from Laurie Rubenstein to Senator
Lieberman (June 16, 1998) [App. at A-65].
The amendment was offered on June 16, shortly before the
amendment deadline that day, and was discussed at a GAC staff
briefing later that afternoon. It was one of five amendments offered
before the deadline and the only one that GAC Chief Counsel Fred
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Ansell recommended that Senator Thompson accept.164 In explaining
the amendment that would add what is now § 3347(a)(1)(B), Mr.
Ansell again described these statutes as “retained” and reminded
Senator Thompson that he “agreed to do this, and language Glenn
wanted on the subject is in the bill. . . . but Lieberman wants to make
sure that statutes that themselves designate who the acting person
should be . . . be retained.”165

Figure 11: Memorandum for Senator Thompson from Fred Ansell, re:
Amendments to S. 2176, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (June 16,
1998) [App. at A-60].

164. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson (June 16, 1998) [App. at A-61].
165. Id.
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When the GAC gathered for a business meeting on June 17, 1998,
every senator there was aware of the amendment. They had not only
been briefed by their staffs in advance, but they also were given a
roughly one-page description of the amendment and the rationale for
it.166 This meant that each GAC senator believed they were voting to
have FVRA function the way it was explained and memorialized in
that one-page memorandum. That same explanation was also
circulated during the GAC business meeting, was included in the
official transcript of that meeting, and is reproduced below. In relevant
part, it reads:
Congress has over the years enacted a number of statutes
directing the means for filling vacancies in specific
positions. CRS has located approximately 40 such
statutes . . . . The Committee has not heard any evidence
suggesting that these provisions have been abused in the
past, nor seen any reason to override past Congresses’
decisions . . . . For that reason, the current draft
‘grandfathers’ many of these provisions . . . in Section
3347(a)(2) . . . . however, this provision inadvertently fails
to grandfather a number of the existing statutes that the bill
presumably does not intend to supplant. . . . Senator
Liberman’s amendment address this problem by making
sure that the grandfather provision covers all existing
statutes specifically providing a means for filling a
vacancy.167

166. Transcript of June 17th GAC Meeting, supra note 86 [App. at A-77].
167. Id. [App. at A-66, A-77–A-78].
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Figure 12: Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings, U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs Business Meeting June 17, 1998
[App. at A-66, A-77–A-78].
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Put simply, there was no ambiguity as to what the provision would
do. Every senator on the committee was told that the amendment that
would become § 3347(a)(1)(B) would ensure that statutes that
designate a successor would not be “overridden”—and that the bill
“does not intend to supplant”168 such statutes. Instead, such provisions
would be “grandfathered.”
In other words, at the time when the senators were voting on the
amendment and on whether to send the bill to the whole Senate, no
senator could have reasonably believed, based on the text of the law
and the description of what it would do, that such “grandfathered”
statutes could occasionally be overridden at the election of the
President. The clear definition and understanding of “grandfathered”
was “a provision that creates an exemption from the law’s effect.”169
But as if all that did not provide enough clarity about the provision
and the section as whole, more was offered. In addition to the staff
briefs, prior agreements, and the circulated summary, Senator
Lieberman also orally described the amendment and its purpose to all
of the Committee at the meeting on June 17, 1998:
Very briefly, in its wisdom, in our wisdom, Congress has
over the years exempted a number of positions, as you
indicated earlier, from the Vacancies Act by providing a
specific way to designate a replacement. The proposal that
the Committee has brought forward in the Vacancies Act
here makes clear that it is not our intention to override those
specific judgments by previous Congresses that have taken
different positions out of the Vacancies Act.
For instance, one that comes to mind—and these are
normally authorization committees that do this. The Armed
168. According to Merriam-Webster, “supplant” means “to take the place of and serve as a substitute
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supplant
for.”
Supplant,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[https://perma.cc/SUK2-GT46] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
169. Grandfather Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) (“A provision
that creates an exemption from the law’s effect for something that existed before the law’s effective date;
specif., a statutory or regulatory clause that exempts a class of persons or transactions because of
circumstances existing before the new rule or regulation takes effect.”).
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Services Committee, in its wisdom, has passed a statute that
says if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vacates the
office, the Vice Chairman becomes the Chairman until
someone is qualified to replace him.
The proposal before us exempts from the purview of the
changes made in it appointments that—statutes in which the
President or the head of an executive department is expressly
authorized to designate an officer to perform the functions
and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity.
I believe inadvertently what is omitted here is another way
this happens, which is statutes that expressly designate an
individual to fill the vacancy as opposed to giving somebody
the authority to designate a replacement. And my
amendment simply would add that to the so-called
grandfather provision of the statute.170
Just before the Committee adopted the amendment unanimously,
Senator Thompson remarked, “I agree. I think that is exactly right.”171
With those explanations freshly in mind, the Committee would vote
9–1 to advance the bill to the whole Senate at the end of that same
meeting.172
A few weeks after Senator Lieberman verbally described his
amendment as “grandfathering” and “exempting” the statutes he
described, the Senate Report would again use the term “retain” to
describe the same statutes that “by their own terms” fill vacancies,
again suggesting no other terms could fill those particular offices:

170. Transcript of June 17th GAC Meeting, supra note 86 [App. at A-75–A-76, A-79].
171. Id. at 35.
172. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 11 (1998) (“Senator Lieberman offered an amendment to retain existing
statutes that by their own terms provide a process for the filling of specific advice and consent
positions . . . . That amendment was agreed to by voice vote. . . . [describing other amendments]. With no
other amendments being offered, Chairman Thompson moved adoption of S. 2176 as amended. The bill
was ordered favorably reported by a vote of 9 Yeas . . . and 1 Nay[.]”).
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Senator Lieberman offered an amendment to retain existing
statutes that by their own terms provide a process for the
filling of specific advice and consent positions
[§ 3347(a)(1)(B)-type statutes], as well as the statues [sic]
referenced in S. 2176 as introduced, which preserved
existing statutes that allow the heads of departments to
designate an acting official [(1)(A)-type statutes]. That
amendment was agreed to by voice vote.173
Senator Thompson—the primary author, shepherd, and
decision-maker of FVRA and its text—did not at all diverge from what
he, Senators Glenn and Lieberman, and in fact the entire committee
had agreed to. Only a few hours before the Senate would vote on
ending debate on his bill to preclude a filibuster—a 53–38 vote in favor
that did not reach the required three-fifths by only two votes—Senator
Thompson explained to the Senate that FVRA would cover all
Senate-confirmed offices, except the ones grandfathered:
The bill will extend the provisions of the Vacancies Act to
cover all advice and consent positions in executive Agencies
except those that are covered by express specific statute that
provide for acting officers to carry out the functions and
duties of the office.174
Again, no mention was made of FVRA functioning as alternatives to
those express specific statutes. To faithfully recast Senator
Thompson’s statement: If all positions are covered by the Vacancies
Act “except” certain ones, then those certain ones are not covered.175
173. Id. (emphases added).
174. 144 CONG. REC. S11,022–23 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (emphases added),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28-pt1-PgS11021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PYL-EUCM].
175. Furthermore, Senator Thompson’s very next sentence in that explanation to the Senate said: “The
bill also exempts multimember commissions, and it retains holdover provisions of current law.” Id. at
S11,023. The use of “also exempts” highlights his preceding statement that express specific statutes are
not covered. See id; see also supra note 155 (Thompson’s GAC chief counsel offering talking
points—made after the manager’s amendment phrasing change to § 3347(a) was agreed to—that
explained FVRA would not “cover” the office-specific succession statutes whose operations were

Published by Reading Room, 2020

53

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

752

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

If, somehow, the provision was still unclear, another floor statement
by Senator Thompson in January 1999, which described a technical fix
to § 3347 and would be enacted later that year,176 should put to rest
any pittance of doubt:
[S]ection 3347 of that statute [FVRA] made clear that
so-called vesting and delegation statutes . . . do not
constitute statutes providing for the filling of a specific
vacant position that the law retains in lieu of the procedures
contained in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act.177
Obviously, if a law is “retained” “in lieu of” FVRA, it means that it
is to be used instead of FVRA.178 Another way of putting that, as the
written description of Senator Lieberman’s amendment did, is that
such statutes cannot be “overridden” or “supplanted” in favor of using
FVRA.179 Or, as Senator Lieberman’s verbal explanation put even
more succinctly: the described statutes in § 3347(a) are “exempted.”180
Look now at how the GAC-reported bill read from June 17 to
September 28, the day the Senate cast 53 votes in favor of moving
forward on the bill:
§ 3347. Application.
(a) Sections 3345 and 3346 are applicable to any office . . .
unless—

“retained”).
176. Act of May 21, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, tit. V, § 5011, 113 Stat. 57, 112.
177. 145
Cong.
Rec.
S33
(daily
ed.
Jan.
6,
1999)
(emphasis
added),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1999/01/06/CREC-1999-01-06-pt1-PgS33-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H63S2DH] (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson).
178. According to Merriam-Webster, “in lieu of” means “in the place of; instead of.” Lieu,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lieu [https://perma.cc/5C4Q-M783]
(last visited Dec. 7, 2019).
179. Transcript of June 17th GAC Meeting, supra note 86 [App. at A-77].
180. Id. [App. at A-75].
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(1) another statutory provision expressly provides that
the such provision supersedes sections 3345 and
3346;
(2) a statutory provision in effect on the date of
enactment of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of
1998 expressly—
(A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of
an Executive department, to designate an officer
or employee to perform the functions and duties
of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity; or
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office
temporarily in an acting capacity; or
(3) the President makes an appointment to fill a vacancy
in such office during the recess of the Senate
pursuant to clause 3 of section 2 of article II of the
United States Constitution.
(b) Any statutory provision providing general authority to
the head of an Executive agency . . . to delegate duties
to, or to reassign duties among, officers or employees of
such Federal agency, is not a statutory provision to
which subsection (a)(2) applies.181
There is no reasonable doubt that when this version was reported
out of the Senate Committee, the Committee agreed as to what the
provisions meant, what they did not mean, as well as what they did not
cover:

181. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 26 (1998).
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•

The described statutes were:
ü “retained,”
ü “preserved,”
ü “grandfathered,” and
ü “exempted.”

•

FVRA covered all advice and consent positions in agencies
“except those that are covered by express specific statute.”182

•

And the described statutes were “‘retained’ ‘in lieu of’ the
procedures contained in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act.”183

The described statutes could
not be:
Ö “overridden,” nor
Ö “supplanted.”

But even without all of that clear legislative understanding and context,
consider again the text of the reported and voted-on bill, shortened for
relevance:
•

“[FVRA is] applicable to any office . . . unless— . . . a statutory
provision . . . designates an officer . . . .”184
3. Removing the Explicit § 508 Exemption from FVRA

The explicit textual exemption for the office of Attorney General,
which was in the Vacancies Act since 1873, was always meant to be,
and indeed was, continued in FVRA. In the first version of a new
vacancies act bill, S. 1764, Senator Thurmond kept the same
exemption, explicitly stating § 508 “shall be applicable.”185 Senator
Byrd’s S. 1761 also kept the exemption.186 So it was no surprise that,
182. 144
CONG.
REC.
S11,022–23
(daily
ed.
Sept.
28,
1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28-pt1-PgS11021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PYL-EUCM].
183. 145 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1999/01/06/CREC1999-01-06-pt1-PgS33-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H63-S2DH].
184. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 26.
185. S. 1764, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998) (as introduced in the Senate on Mar. 16, 1998),
https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s1764/BILLS-105s1764is.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2MH-8YE3]
(“With respect to the office of the Attorney General of the United States, the provisions of section 508 of
title 28 shall be applicable.”).
186. S. 1761, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998), https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s1761/BILLS-
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in April 1998, the first staff draft of Senator Thompson’s S. 2176 also
retained the explicit exemption.187 It even remained after revisions
were made to incorporate the June 5 agreement to retain prior specific
statutes, and it remained in the first formally introduced version of
S. 2176 on June 16.188
When the GAC Democratic staff noticed that the phrasing of the
provision that implemented their June 5 agreement was not
comprehensive enough to cover what was intended, they only had a
day or two to act. Substantive amendments were due by June 16, and
a vote to advance the bill out of committee was scheduled for the next
day, June 17.189 As a result, efforts were focused on fixing the language
of the grandfathering section to better align with the agreement.190
Those efforts resulted in Senator Lieberman’s amendment, which later
became § 3347(a)(1)(B). Other, more technical, fixes would be put off
until later. And so, the explicit § 508 exemption again remained in the
bill when it was reported out of committee to the Senate.191
However, the fact that the explicit exemption remained in the bill
when the grandfathering provisions were added does not signify
anything. It remained in the bill because it was thought to be a minor
issue and a technical fix that could be attended to later, especially since
there was not enough time to deal with all of the identified minor issues
in one day. This is evidenced by a June 16 memo sent by Democratic
GAC counsel to the GAC Chief Counsel one day before the bill was
voted out of committee.192 Among the list of items that were to be
addressed in the future—entitled “other issues”—there was one
especially relevant recommendation:

105s1761is.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2J2-C7FK] (as introduced in the Senate on Mar. 16, 1998) (this bill
would have left § 3345 and the then-existing exemption unaffected, thereby keeping it in force).
187. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 113.
188. S. 2176, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998), https://www.congress.gov/105/bills/s2176/BILLS105s2176is.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNA2-7RWE] (as introduced in the Senate on June 16, 1998) (“With
respect to the office of the Attorney General of the United States, the provisions of section 508 of title 28
shall be applicable.”).
189. Memorandum from Laurie Rubenstein to Senator Lieberman, supra note 163.
190. Id.
191. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 25 (1998).
192. Memorandum from Governmental Affairs Comm. Minority Staff to Fred Ansell (June 16, 1998)
[App. at A-80].
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“Delete 3345(c) [the § 508 exemption] because it is included in
3347(a)(2).”193

Figure 13: Key excerpt of a June 16, 1998 memo sent by Democratic
GAC staff to GAC Chief Counsel Fred Ansell [App. at A-80–A-81].
A different Democratic counsel on GAC ensured that this
understanding was accurate in a memorandum to CRS specialist Mort
Rosenberg194 on June 25:
•

“§ 3345(c): Is this subsection necessary? Isn’t it included in
3347(a)?”195

Figure 14: Key excerpt of a June 25, 1998 memo from Democratic
GAC counsel Debbie Lehrich to CRS researcher Mort Rosenberg (the
excerpts are from the same page, but lighting differed at the bottom of
the page) [App. at A-82].
193. Id. (listing technical fixes, amendments, and “other issues”).
194. Mr. Rosenberg’s influence was often noted by the Supreme Court, and his writings were cited with
approval and for historical accuracy in NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935–36 (2017) (Roberts,
C.J.).
195. Memorandum from Debbie Lehrich to Mort Rosenberg (June 25, 1998) [App. at A-82] (“As we
discussed a series of open issues—both drafting and substantive—for your review follows. . . . § 3345(c):
Is this subsection necessary? Isn’t it included in 3347(a)?”). Ms. Lehrich took over Mr. Plocher’s
responsibilities as he was departing to a new job.
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It is known that this decision to remove § 508 was viewed only as a
technical fix because future memos would so indicate, including one
on July 14 that referenced an agreement to make changes in a future
Managers’ Amendment.196 The “Additional Views” section of the
Senate Report, submitted by Democratic senators, also referenced this
agreement.197 In that section, there was reference to “several other
issues of concern to us which we believe are of a technical nature,” but
which staffs from all sides agreed “to aim to address these issues in a
Managers’ Amendment as the bill is considered by the full Senate.”198
And as just detailed above, the June 16 memo, which was sent to the
GAC Chief Counsel, listed removing the § 508 exemption as one of
several points under a heading titled “Other issues.”199
As expected, and as that expectation was memorialized in the Senate
Report, senators and staff from both parties worked together on a
Managers’ Amendment to FVRA. That Amendment was submitted by
Senator Thompson on September 25, 1998, and it included a provision
that removed the redundant exemption for § 508.200
Tellingly, a September 24 memo from the GAC Chief Counsel to
Senator Thompson listed several larger issues to be addressed in that
very Managers’ Amendment—including changing certain phrasing in
§ 3347—but it did not mention the removal of the § 508 exemption.201
And because the memo stated it “summarized the proposed managers’

196. See E-mail from Debbie Lehrich to Democratic Staff (July 14, 1998) [App. at A-87] (“Attached
are additional views to the vacancies act of senator glenn and any of your bosses who are interested. This
new draft reflects a conversation with Fred Ansell in which he agreed to address the following issues in a
Managers’ Amendment (see second to last paragraph of views).”). Indeed, the Senate Report’s Additional
Views would confirm that identified technical changes would be addressed “in a Managers’ Amendment
as the bill is considered by the full Senate.” S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 32–33.
197. Memorandum on Additional Views of Senator Glenn to the Committee Report on S. 2176 (1998)
[App. at A-84].
198. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 32–33 (emphasis added to “other issues” to highlight that the removal of
the redundant § 508 exemption was listed in a June 16 memo described above under the same heading
“other issues”).
199. Memorandum from Governmental Affairs Comm. Minority Staff to Fred Ansell, supra note 192
[App. at A-80].
200. 144
CONG.
REC.
S10,996
(daily
ed.
Sept.
25,
1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/09/25/CREC-1998-09-25-pt1-PgS10986-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26TL-B4J8] (Thompson Amendment No. 3653 to S.2176).
201. Memorandum from Fred Ansell, Chief Counsel of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, to
Senator Fred Thompson, Comm. Chairman on Vacancies Act (Sept. 24, 1998) [App. at A-92].
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amendment . . . other than the very technical changes,” it logically and
contextually stands that the removal of the § 508 exemption was seen
as a non-substantive and only technical change.
Even in a September 28, 1998 memorandum from the Senate
Republican Policy Committee to all Republican Senators, the bill was
described as follows:
S. 2176 also preserves a number of existing statutes that
provide a process by which persons can serve as acting
officers when particular offices are vacant. In most
instances, these officials can serve until a successor is
confirmed, without regard to the Vacancies Act. . . . Possible
Amendments: Manager’s amendment. Making technical
corrections.202
Of course, at that time, the items in the Managers’ Amendment were
known, agreed to, and already offered, but no description of either
“exclusive” or the removal of the § 508 explicit exemption was
discussed, other than “technical corrections.”203 Senator Thompson’s
October floor statements, which were meant to be a sort of managers’
report,204 echoed the exact same sentiment: “All other changes are
intended to be purely technical.”205
Accordingly, it is clear that although the Senators and staff knew
about the explicit exemption for § 508, even when voting on the bill
out of committee, and knew that it was likely to be removed, none
thought it any kind of a substantial change. Nor did any Senators or
202. U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., S.2176 – The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 1998
LEGIS. NOTICE NO. 97, at 4–5 (Sept. 28, 1998) [App. at A-108, A-111].
203. See supra notes 200–201.
204. 144
CONG.
REC.
S12,823
(daily
ed.
Oct.
21,
1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-senate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZ8XFD5P] (“I wish to address the changes that have been made to S. 2176 since it was reported out of the
Governmental Affairs Committee. The legislative history of the bill is largely described in the Committee
report, S. Rep. 105–250. However, this is the opportunity to discuss the subsequent changes made in the
bill.”). Because these statements served as a kind of conference or managers’ report, they should not be
treated as ordinary colloquies or floor speeches. Rather, the statements should hold more weight than even
the Senate Report, which only dealt with a previous and subsequently altered version of the bill.
205. Id. (Sen. Fred Thompson not addressing the removal of the § 508 exemption and stating, “All other
changes are intended to be purely technical.”).
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staff evidently think it would even be worth a mention or hint of
discussion.
In other words, the omission of the § 508 exemption was
non-controversial and non-substantive because everyone thought the
grandfathering categories would continue the exemption and
accomplish the same thing, making it redundant. The same was true
after the Managers’ Amendment was submitted to the whole Senate,
with not even a hint of discussion or concern; the change was
non-substantive and purely technical. The existing understanding that
only § 508 controlled who was authorized to be an Acting Attorney
General was therefore continued by FVRA.
Not noticing or researching these histories, OLC’s key
argument—that the removal of the § 508 exemption from the FVRA
bill and from the prior codified Vacancies Act signals support for its
reading—could not be further from the truth. In fact, that it was
removed as redundant helps confirm the very opposite of its argument.
The § 508 exemption was only removed because § 3347(a)(1)(B) was
meant to accomplish the exact same thing: have all categorically
described statutes remain controlling by their own terms.
4. FVRA and § 3347’s Structure
Another key OLC argument is that § 508 was not intended to be
exempted from FVRA’s reach because a different section, § 3349c,
lists certain offices as excluded from FVRA, and the office of Attorney
General is not among them.206 In other words, because OLC believes
that § 3349c was the only proper place in the statute for excluded
offices, the fact that it did not list the office of Attorney General shows
that Congress did not mean for it to be excluded. Without even
incorporating the dispositive histories above, this particular argument
can be quickly dismissed.

206. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 4 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download [https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY]. This same
argument was used in the 2007 opinion but was given more prominence in the 2018 Opinion; see also
Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. 208 (2007).

Published by Reading Room, 2020

61

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

760

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

Before beginning it must be noted that OLC’s argument chases
ghosts. It asks others to disprove why something was not written in the
way OLC would have preferred it had been. Endless similar arguments
could be volleyed back at OLC for why its reading is not supported
with text that says the President may choose from either law, as well
as many others. Still, for the sake of thoroughness, OLC’s argument is
analyzed.
First, some technical observations. OLC’s “structural” argument
ignores that § 3349c was meant to only cover multi-member
commissions or other similar entities. There is not a single exclusion
listed in that section that covers only one office—all examples have
multiple members.207 It seems OLC may simply not have looked at the
explanation for this section in the Senate Report, which stated § 3349c
aimed to keep such multi-member entities exempt and only included
this section to “avoid any confusion.”208 The entities that are separately
listed after § 3349c(1) were added because they were anomalous as
“multi-member independent agenc[ies] that Congress has not placed
in an independent establishment but in a department.”209 At the time of
the Senate Report, only the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
was found as one such anomaly.210 Later another was discovered and
added: the Surface Transportation Board, which moved from the
dissolved Interstate Commerce Commission to the Department of
Transportation in 1996.211
Plus, § 3349c was not the only place where certain offices were
excluded. It is indisputable that other sections, namely §§ 3347(a) and
3349b, excluded the GAO and holdover provisions. And we already
know that the holdover provision in § 3349b was consistently
described in the same way as provisions in § 3347(a): “retained.”212
207. 5 U.S.C. § 3349c (2018).
208. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 22 (1998).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. About STB, SURFACE TRANSP. BOARD, https://www. https://prod.stb.gov/about-stb/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2020).
212. This section might, however, give other indications as to 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). When described, this
3349c, written as “excluded,” was often grouped with the description of § 3447. See 144 CONG. REC.
S11,022–23 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28pt1-PgS11021.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PYL-EUCM] (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (stating, directly
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Next, understand that many multi-member entities did not have
specific succession statutes, and when they did, they often only dealt
with leadership of that entity, not appointment to it. Thus, for many of
these entities, listing them in § 3347—where only existing succession
statutes were exempted—would have still subjected them to FVRA’s
appointment process to fill vacancies. In other words, it would have
been pointless to exempt entities in § 3347(a)(1) that did not qualify
under its terms. Also, moving the categorical exemptions from § 3347
to § 3349c would have been technically difficult, because the
housekeeping statutes prohibition in § 3347(b) would also had to have
been transferred, making the section longer and more awkwardly
phrased. The entities listed and described in § 3349c generally do not
have housekeeping statutes.
Perhaps most importantly, OLC’s argument would make significant
parts of FVRA a nullity. Section 3349c says nearly all of FVRA would
not apply to listed offices. Had the categories in § 3347(a)(1) been
moved to § 3349c, the enforcement provisions of § 3348, such as
precluding later use of ratification and making violative actions have
no force or effect, would not have applied to those described offices in
cases of illegal appointment. In addition, those categories would still
have been in danger of being sidestepped because FVRA’s prohibition
on the use of housekeeping statutes would not have applied to any
offices in those categories. In other words, placing the § 3347(a)(1)
categories in § 3349c would have empowered the same problem
FVRA primarily aimed to stop, the use of housekeeping statutes, and
it would have eliminated any consequence for doing so.
OLC did, however, have one valid point on this subject: the
structure of the statute can be used to indicate certain concepts and
intent.213 OLC, in needing to find some loose justification for its view,
after saying the “Vacancies Act [would] cover all advice and consent positions in the executive Agencies
except those covered by express specific statutes,” that “[t]he bill also exempts multimember
commissions, and it retains holdover provisions of current law”; thereby grouping the provisions in
§§ 3347, 3349b, and 3349c as similar, and stating that § 3349b (the kind of statutes that “shall not be
construed to [be] affect[ed] [by FVRA]”) are “retained”—the same phrase used numerous times to
describe the § 3347(a) statutes at issue here (emphases added)).
213. E.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Reference to
statutory design and pertinent legislative history may often shed new light on congressional intent,
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picked the only potential structural argument that it thought might
help. One can wonder whether OLC considered the structural
argument that clearly hurt its position: the structure of § 3347.
An examination of the categorical exemptions included in either the
enacted § 3347 or its draft versions shows that every category within
that section was always understood to be superseding. Consider the
changes § 3347 underwent from final draft bill to the enacted FVRA
law. The key words from the draft bill that were omitted are presented
in strikethrough; additions made to the enacted FVRA are in italics;
and unstyled times new roman font indicates no change.
Sections 3345 and 3346 are applicable to any office of an
Executive agency . . . are the exclusive means for
temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the
functions and duties of any office of an Executive agency
. . . , unless—
(1) another statutory provision expressly provides that
the such [sic] provision supersedes sections 3345
and 3346 [or] . . .
(2) (1) a statutory provision in effect on the date of
enactment of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of
1998 expressly—
(A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of
an Executive department, to designate an officer
or employee to perform the functions and duties
of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity; or
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office
temporarily in an acting capacity; or
(3) (2) the President makes an appointment to fill a
vacancy in such office during the recess of the

notwithstanding statutory language that appears superficially clear.”).
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Senate pursuant to clause 3 of section 2 of article II
of the United States Constitution.214
The change that removed the first stricken paragraph (1) concerned
only whether FVRA would make all future laws state whether they are
intended to comply with or override FVRA.215 But by having that
stricken provision and its “supersedes” language grouped with the two
provisions that remained—not to mention the recess appointment
provision, which would objectively supersede FVRA if used—it
seems apparent that the subsection was structured to have all of its
elements supersede FVRA. No one would reasonably argue that recess
appointments or future-enacted statutes with express superseding
language would allow FVRA to somehow be used as alternatives to
those statutes or the Constitution. Yet OLC argues that one of these
provisions is different—the category that includes § 508—but never
explains why.
Other structural clues can be seen as well. Consider what the bill did
temporally. In an attempt to ensure the bill was exclusive, the draft bill
captured “any office” and then created exemptions for future and past
laws. Future laws would have to expressly state that they supersede the
bill. But because the same express statement requirement could not be
required of prior laws, the bill could only describe
automatic-designation statutes when looking backwards. After all, it
would be strange to allow future laws to supersede FVRA but not
allow any past laws to do the same—especially in the same “unless”
subsection.216
214. Compare S. 2176, 105th Cong. (1998), as reprinted in S. REP. NO. 105-250 at 26 (1998), with 5
U.S.C. § 3347 (2018).
215. It should be noted that such a provision would have been suspect on the basis that “one legislature
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810). A
requirement to have Congress insert such a provision in future laws relating to FVRA could have been
seen as similarly abridging.
216. Cf. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2018) (“Thousands of
statutory provisions use the phrase ‘except as provided in . . . ’ followed by a cross-reference in order to
indicate that one rule should prevail over another in any circumstance in which the two conflict.”). If the
statutes were truly meant to coexist as OLC claims, then why even have this provision? Would it not have
made more sense and have been far simpler to write a provision that stated no prior designation statutes
are repealed? The very structure of this provision shows that a specific grandfathering was intended to
occur.
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This structure squares with the legislative intent and histories
described above. Still, OLC and other proponents either ignored or did
not examine this objective structure and instead zoomed in on only one
word they suddenly enchanted and empowered: “exclusive.” But, as
will be shown next, Congress did not intend for the word “exclusive”
to mean anything different than “applicable to any,” nor did that word
change how “exclusive” any Vacancies Act has always been—and it
certainly did not create a new power to override other required laws.
5. “Applicable to Any Office” vs. “Exclusive”
Knowing that no text of FVRA says that it could function as an
alternative to retained and required statutes, OLC falls back to a loose
textual inference to save its position. OLC attempts to empower the
word “exclusive” with authorities to reach other statutes outside of
FVRA. But at the same time, OLC ignores the term “designates” and
its implications altogether. Under OLC’s reading, “exclusive” allows
FVRA to be used as a discretionary alternative to the designating
statutes FVRA grandfathered, and it effectively overrides their
mandatory terms.
It is true that § 3347 underwent a rewording between its final bill
form and enactment, changing “are applicable to any office . . . unless”
to “are the exclusive means . . . unless.” But it is not true that the
change was intended to mean anything different. It was simply what
Senator Byrd all throughout the legislative process called “a tightening
of language” to ensure that DOJ could not continue using
housekeeping statutes like §§ 509 and 510 to appoint acting officers.217
It did not have any effect on § 508 or other exempted (1)(B)-type
statutes. On that point, the legislative history is again clear.
Even before FVRA, all versions of the Vacancies Act were always
thought to be the sole or “exclusive” means for filling vacancies—and
their text even stated as much. The first modern Vacancies Act in 1868
217. E.g., Hearings, supra note 74, at 18 (“Senator Glenn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under your
legislation, as I understand it, we would have to have an express exemption in another statute in order for
any position to fall outside the Vacancies Act, is that correct? Senator Byrd: That is correct. And I hope
we will make it so tight, so air-tight, so water-tight that no department can find a crack or a crevice
anywhere through which to creep [Laughter].”); S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 9 (similarly stating).
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had a clause that used different wording to say it was exclusive: “no
appointment . . . otherwise than as is herein provided . . . shall be
made . . . .”218 The 1873 codified version kept the same.219 The 1966
codification into positive law also kept nearly the exact same
language.220 Even the 1988 Vacancies Act amendments, according to
two Senate Reports, were intended to “make[] clear that the Vacancies
Act is the exclusive authority of the temporary appointment.”221
The issue over exclusivity of the Vacancies Act vis-à-vis
housekeeping statutes was the single largest impetus for FVRA.222
DOJ and others correctly believed that later-enacted and more specific
statutes controlled.223 But many in Congress, and also GAO, believed
that argument to be foreclosed by 1988 amendments to a different part
218. Act of July 28, 1868, ch. 227, § 2, 15 Stat. 168, 168 (“And no appointment, designation, or
assignment otherwise than as is herein provided, in the cases mentioned in the first, second, and third
sections of this act, shall be made except to fill a vacancy happening during the recess of the Senate.”);
see also, e.g., Hearings, supra note 74, at 3 (“[T]he legislative history of 1868 certainly indicated that the
Framers seemed to think that the Vacancies Act was the exclusive means by which appointments were
made.”).
219. REV. STAT. § 181 (1873) (“No temporary appointment, designation . . . shall be made otherwise
than as provided by those sections, except to fill a vacancy happening during a recess of the Senate.”).
220. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 426; 5 U.S.C. § 3349 (1966) (stating an
appointment “may not be made otherwise than as provided by [the Act], except to fulfill a vacancy
occurring during a recess of the Senate”).
221. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4 (quoting a Senate Report addressing the 1988 changes and what would
become the Vacancies Act (S. REP. NO. 100-317, at 14 (1988)); see also Hearings, supra note 74, at 3
(opening statement of Chairman Thompson) (“So, in 1988, Congress passed an amendment to the
Vacancies Act . . . . And, again, they stated that the Vacancies Act was supposed to be the exclusive
means, unless there were some specific statutes specifically delineated that certain other people could be
appointed otherwise.”).
222. E.g., Vacancies Act, 22 Op. O.L.C. 44, 47 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17; Hearings, supra
note 74, at 62–63 (Jan. 14, 1998 memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, CRS, summarizing DOJ’s
position as: “[A] congressional waiver of the statutory restrictions on temporary designations. Thus, DOJ
argues, where the organic act of a department or agency vests the powers and functions of the department
in its head and authorizes that officer to delegate such powers and functions to subordinate officials or
employees as she sees fit, such authority supersedes the general restrictions of law on temporarily filling
advice and consent positions . . . .”); see also id. 116–17, 138–49 (positions of DOJ); OLC’s position on
the Vacancies Act and its statement before the Senate committee that led to the FVRA); see supra
section II.B. (discussing the history of the Vacancies Act).
223. E.g., Vacancies Act, 22 Op. O.L.C. at 47 (distinguishing between the “housekeeping” or “vesting
and delegation statutes” like §§ 509 and 510 and “statutes that name particular positions”; also arguing
that the “vesting and delegation” statutes were “enacted after the Vacancies Act [of 1868, which was
simply reenacted over time] and supplement it, and § 3349 could not preclude later Congresses from
granting this expanded authority.”). “Vesting and delegation statutes” are defined as those that “vest[] an
agency’s powers in the agency head and allow[] delegation to subordinate officials . . . to assign, on an
interim basis, the powers of certain vacant Senate-confirmed offices.” Id. at 44. The term is used
interchangeably with “housekeeping” statutes.
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of the Vacancies Act, and by a clear legislative history indicating the
act’s “exclusivity” and superseding authority over unspecified
appointment authorities—or “housekeeping statutes”—like §§ 509
and 510.224 FVRA was determinatively written in such a way to affirm
that position and foreclose DOJ’s contrary take,225 not to affect the
statutes it grandfathered.
To accomplish that central goal, FVRA and its § 3347 utilized a
legislative technique previously characterized as “catch-and-release.”
To ensure that FVRA would be considered first in controlling
appointments, it was initially written to catch every vacancy by stating
it was “applicable to any office.” It would then “release” and keep
certain provisions if they satisfied certain criteria that followed
“unless. . .” And as an extra precaution to ensure that no housekeeping
statutes like §§ 509 and 510 could survive, § 3347(b) foreclosed any
errant interpretations by stating: “any statutory provision providing
general authority to the head of an Executive agency is not a statutory
provision to which subsection (a)(1) applies.”226
While the final and enacted version of FVRA uses the term
“exclusive,” there is strong and ample evidence that “applicable to
224. See supra notes 108–110, 217, 221.
225. 144 CONG. REC. S12,824 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/crec/
1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHZ6-TQXE] (statement of Sen.
Robert Byrd: “[A] a fair assessment of this entire issue to say that the matter of exclusivity is the bedrock
point on which the executive and legislative branches have historically differed. . . . [I]n an effort to
squarely address past problems, the Act specifically prohibits the use of general, ‘housekeeping’ statutes
as a basis for circumventing the Vacancies Act. Provisions such as, but not limited to, 28 U.S.C. § 509
and § 510, which vest all functions of the Department of Justice in the Attorney General and allow the
Attorney General to delegate responsibility for carrying out those functions, shall not be construed as
providing an alternative means of filling vacancies.”); see also Hearings, supra note 74, at 27, 29–30
(“[W]e [GAO] would suggest adding an amendment to explicitly provide that the Vacancies Act can be
superseded only by another statute that provides an alternative means for filling a specific identified
vacancy. . . . [A]mendment of the Act to clarify congressional intent could help ensure that the Act is
followed . . . .”).
226. E.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 9 (“Section 3347(b) expressly negates the DOJ position that
the statutory vesting of general agency authority in the head of any agency and allowing the agency head
to delegate or reassign those vested duties and responsibilities to other agency officers or employees
thereby provides an alternative to the Act’s otherwise exclusive means of temporarily filling vacant
positions.”); see
also
145
CONG.
REC.
S33
(daily
ed.
Jan.
6,
1999),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1999/01/06/CREC-1999-01-06-pt1-PgS33-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H63S2DH] (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“There is no question that the vesting and delegation statutes
do not constitute provisions for the temporary appointment of specific officers, even without the
cross-reference, which was designed to be even more emphatic.”).
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any,” as was in the bill until late September 1998, was intended to
mean exactly the same thing. At the outset, the very first draft of
S. 2176 in April 1998 (which followed the March hearings on Senator
Thurmond’s S. 1764) used the language “applicable to any
office . . . unless.”227 And in that staff draft for Senator Thompson, the
drafters wrote margin notes indicating that § 3347 was always
intended to be exclusive, even with the “applicable to any office
language,” stating: “tracks Thurmond and Byrd to show that this bill
is the exclusive means of filling acting executive branch positions.”228

Figure 4 (from above): The first draft of S. 2176 and FVRA’s § 3347
regarding exclusivity.
Even before the categorical exemption for succession statutes was
added to the bill, concern about was raised whether the “applicable to”
phrasing was strong enough to accomplish the main goal of the bill.
Figure 15 below shows that as early as June 16, that language troubled
227. Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 113.
228. Id. (emphasis added).
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some on the Democratic staff who worried it was not clear enough to
override the housekeeping statutes that were its main target.229 In other
words, the worry was that DOJ might construe the whole section as
permissive, thus negating the impetus for the entire bill.

Figure 15: A larger excerpt from a June 16 memo reproduced above,
in Figure 13 [App. at A-81–A-82].
A June 25 memo from GAC Democratic Counsel Debbie Lehrich
to Morton Rosenberg of CRS recounted the same concern and asked
for an opinion on how the section might be interpreted—specifically,
whether the way it was written could still allow DOJ to read their
housekeeping statutes as alternatives.230

Figure 16: A different excerpt from a June 25 memo reproduced above,
in Figure 14 [App. at A-83–A-84].
The possibility that DOJ might still read this section to allow
housekeeping statutes was so concerning that in a first draft of the
“Additional Views” section (a section included in the Senate Report

229. Id.; Memorandum from Governmental Affairs Comm. Minority Staff to Fred Ansell, supra note
192.
230. Memorandum from Debbie Lehrich to Morton Rosenberg, supra note 195.
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and which several key senators signed on to), a separate paragraph
detailed that worry about the bill’s exclusivity.231 The relevant excerpt
from that draft is reproduced below, in Figure 17: “We would suggest
language with meaning similar to current law, which would quell any
possible interpretation that Congress does not intend the Vacancies Act
to be the only means for filling Vacancies, notwithstanding
grandfathered statutes or an explicit supersession.”232

Figure 17: A draft of the “Additional Views” section of the Democratic
Staff (undated, but before June 15, 1998) [App. at A-85–A-87].
But by July 14, 1998, another compromise had been reached, and
senators and staff from both sides agreed that “applicable to any”
would be changed to “exclusive” in a future “Managers’
Amendment.”233 That agreement is reflected in a message reproduced
in Figure 18, below.

231. Memorandum on Additional Views of Senator Glenn to the Committee Report on S. 2176, supra
note 197.
232. Id.
233. E-mail from Debbie Lehrich to Democratic Staff, supra note 196.
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Figure 18: A July 14, 1998 email from Debbie Lehrich to Democratic
staff explaining that the substitution of “exclusive” in lieu of
“applicable to” was agreed upon shortly before the Senate Report was
issued [App. at A-87].
Because an agreement had been reached, the above language regarding
exclusivity in a draft “Additional Views” section was deleted. But in
its place, in the final and published version of those same views in the
Senate Report, the agreement was explicitly referenced:
[T]here are several other issues of concern to us which we
believe are of a technical nature. While they are important
issues in that their resolution affects the way a new law could
be interpreted, because there is agreement between Majority
and Minority staffs to aim to address these issues in a
Managers’ Amendment as the bill is considered by the full
Senate, such issues will not be enumerated here.234

234. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 32–33 (1998) (emphases added).
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Not only did that agreement cover exclusivity, but as recounted
above, it also covered the removal of the redundant explicit exemption
for the office of Attorney General.235
Tellingly, even though the majority and minority knew the language
would be changed, they still characterized the version of the bill that
had the “applicable to any . . . unless” language as “exclusive” several
times in Senate Report.236
Finally, when it came time to introduce the Managers’ Amendment
on the floor, the GAC’s Chief Counsel reminded Senator Thompson
of the purpose and effect of the language change: “The language Byrd
wanted on exclusivity of this law is made more authoritative: The
exclusive means . . . .”237

235. Id.
236. E.g., id. at 1, 8, 12 (describing the version of the bill that used the “applicable to any office”
language and at least three separate times characterizing that bill as being “exclusive”).
237. Memorandum from Fred Ansell, Chief Counsel of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, to
Senator Fred Thompson, Comm. Chairman on Vacancies Act, supra note 201 (emphasis added). The
manager’s amendment was agreed to before Mr. Ansell’s responses to the White House talking points
made clear that the “bill would not affect . . . [and in fact] retains the operation of statutes Congress has
passed that govern vacancies in particular positions . . . [such offices] will not be covered by this bill.”
See supra note 155.
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Figure 19: Memo from GAC Chief Counsel Fred Ansell to Senator
Thompson (Sept. 24, 1998) [App. at A-92].
Later, in the floor speeches that served as a kind of managers’ report
on FVRA, Senator Thompson characterized the substituted phrase
“exclusive” as a stylistic change meant only to emphasize the same
understanding: that it was the “sole means” for appointment.238
Senator Byrd, in the same kind of floor statement, characterized the
language change as “hopefully” ending the “decades-long
disagreement” about the exclusivity of the Vacancies Act.239
238. 144
CONG.
REC.
S12,823
(daily
ed.
Oct.
21,
1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QHZ6-TQXE] (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“The phrase ‘applicable to’ is
replaced by ‘the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions
and duties of’ in § 3347(a) to ensure that the Vacancies Act provides the sole means by which temporary
officers may be appointed unless contrary statutory language as set forth by this legislation creates an
explicit exception.”); id. at S12,824 (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (“[T]he matter of exclusivity is the
bedrock point on which the executive and legislative branches have historically differed. . . . Accordingly,
it is my fervent hope that the language of the Act will, once and for all, end this decades-long
disagreement.”).
239. Id. at S12,824 (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).
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Critically, as shown, there is overwhelming evidence that the
phrasing change from “applicable to any office . . . unless” to
“exclusive . . . unless” was meant to function the same way—and to be
even more “authoritative” to foreclose any unintended construction by
DOJ. Additionally, because the senators and staffs pushing for the
language change wanted the section to be exclusive, “notwithstanding
grandfathered statutes”—and because those same senators and staffs
exempted those same statutes just two weeks earlier—it cannot be
implied that FVRA was ever meant to function as an alternative to
those grandfathered statutes.
But in case this were not enough, Senator Byrd also said something
quite telling in his floor statement to the Senate: if specific succession
statutes “are enacted in the future,” they would function the same way
as similar “statutory provisions [that already] exist.”240 This supports
the conclusion that all grandfathered statutes were intended to control,
whether already passed into law or enacted in the future. This is
especially so because Senator Byrd knew that he could not bind future
Congresses, and he surely knew the well-settled canon and DOJ’s
position that a later-enacted and more specific provision controls.
After all, that DOJ position was what caused him to work so hard to
enact FVRA. Thus, if a future succession statute clearly controlled,
and existing statutes were to function the same way, then existing
statutes were intended to control as well. This again represents an
overwhelming consistency as to how FVRA was explained and
understood when enacted. And it again discredits OLC’s position.
6. Problems with the Ambiguous Senate Report Quote
Apart from focusing on the term “exclusive,” the other main point
on which OLC hangs its hat is a single awkwardly written quote from
the Senate Report on the draft bill:
[E]ven with respect to the specific positions in which
temporary officers may serve under the specific statutes this
240. Id.
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bill retains, the Vacancies Act would continue to provide an
alternative procedure for temporarily occupying the
office.241
OLC and other proponents seize on this “alternative procedure” quote
as their only piece of legislative history to aver that either § 508 or
FVRA may be used as alternatives to act in the office of Attorney
General.242
But in relying so heavily on this quote, OLC overlooks the simple
point that “alternative procedure” does not refer to using the
procedures in FVRA to be the alternative; rather, it refers to the
“alternative procedure” within the grandfathered statutes themselves:
“with respect to the . . . statutes this bill retains.”243 In other words, the
quote speaks of FVRA continuing to provide, in § 3347, alternative
procedures to those in § 3345, i.e., different procedures.244 This
distinction is significant because the Vacancies Act was always
thought to be superseded by those “alternative procedures,” even
though no text in the Act clearly stated so. All that this quote says is
that the Vacancies Act would continue the alternative procedures
found in the at least forty-some statutes that the bill retained.
Other sections of the Senate Report offer support for that reading.
The awkward phrasing used in the quote directly aligns with March
1998 testimony on a similar bill, which was recounted on page 10 of
the Report and used the same term: “GAO’s recommendation [was]
that legislation be passed to explicitly provide that the Vacancies Act
can be superseded only by a statute providing an alternative means for

241. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17 (1998).
242. Relying on legislative history, but only on one non-contextual sentence of it, OLC has repeatedly
stated: “‘the Senate Committee Report accompanying the Act expressly disavows’ the view that, where
another statute is available, the Vacancies Reform Act may not be used.” Designating an Acting Attorney
Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 6 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download
[https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY] (quoting Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen.,
31 Op. O.L.C. 208 (2007), which, in turn, cited S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17).
243. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17.
244. See Alternative, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alternative
[https://perma.cc/XPT9-68F3] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (as a second definition, “different from the usual
or conventional”).
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filling a particular vacancy.”245 Plus, two sentences before the quote at
issue, the filling of vacancies according to office-specific statutes was
referred to as “the existing procedure,” and the Report questions if
future committees should reexamine whether to “continue” it.246
Furthermore, in the list of forty-some retained statutes just above that
quote, when a statute had two different paths for appointment, they
were characterized as “two alternatives.”247
Regardless, the phrase “would continue to provide an alternative
procedure” is key. Indeed, if the FVRA would have allowed itself to
displace those “alternative” succession statutes, which even DOJ
admitted were superseding, it would have marked the first time in over
125 years that would have been true. The only way it would have
“continued” any understanding as to the Vacancies Act is if those
retained statutes continued to be superseding—as DOJ, OLC, GAO,
and even the Senate all agreed they were.248 Such a reading also
squares with the specific-over-general canon of statutory construction.
In contrast, OLC’s reading does not explain how to square that § 508
appeared twice in the Report’s list of retained statutes, with
then-§ 3345(c), which still stated that only § 508 and not FVRA would
be applicable.249 If § 508 was an alternative to FVRA in that version
of the bill, how could a different section say it was superseding? The
better reading, and one which does square two sections of that same
bill, is that office-specific statutes like § 508 were meant to control.
Thus, this quote, upon which OLC so heavily relies, does not say
that FVRA would offer an alternative to those statutes.250 But it does
245. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 10 (emphasis added); see also Hearings, supra note 74, at 29, 152 (oral
and written testimony of GAO Associate General Counsel Joan M. Hollenbach, using the same
“alternative” term).
246. Id. at 17, 20 (“[S]ection 3347 retains the existing statutory procedure for filling a vacancy in the
general counsel of the NLRB.” (emphasis added)).
247. Id. at 16.
248. See sources cited supra note 86.
249. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 16, 25.
250. This construction is the mistake OLC made in 2007, when it construed the “alternative procedure”
the wrong way, believing FVRA to be the alternative procedure, not the specific designation statute, as
was the true case. Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. 208, 209
(2007) (“Furthermore, nothing in the text of the statute or its legislative history supports the conclusion
that the “alternative procedure” of the Vacancies Reform Act may be used only when no one can serve
under a statute like 28 U.S.C. § 508.” (emphasis added)). OLC was wrong about not only to what the
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say that those grandfathered statutes would continue to provide an
alternative procedure to FVRA, just as they had always done to the
Vacancies Act.
Think of the schema in this way. FVRA was meant to foreclose the
use of housekeeping statutes, so it was written to be the statute where
one would always start. One would then use § 3345(a), unless a recess
appointment or office-specific statute applied in § 3347(a), in which
case that section would control. In that way, FVRA continued to allow
for those alternative procedures to its otherwise usual ones. The
office-specific statutes referenced in § 3347, the alternative
procedures, could not have been placed in § 3349(c) and excluded
because otherwise the enforcement mechanisms in § 3348 would not
apply to those office-specific statutes, as they were intended to.
In any event, and even if the quote in the Senate Report somehow
means what OLC so heavily relies on it to mean, opposite all other
indications in legislative history, including those after the Senate
Report was published, it is at best ambiguous and therefore unreliable.
But at worst for OLC, the “continuing” practice to which the quote
refers flatly supports that the more specific “alternative procedures”
remained controlling—as they had been for over a century. Otherwise,
to credit OLC’s position would mean that this one ambiguous and
awkwardly worded quote, which would have affected at least
thirty-five other offices and their twelve different Senate standing
committees, was clear enough to the senators who advanced it. But the
documents above confirm it was not. Moreover, at the time the Senate
Report with this quote was issued, the “exclusive” phrasing had not
been adopted and would not be for months to come. The senators in
committee only voted on “applicable to any . . . unless.”251
Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that such a colossal elephant
of a change would have been introduced in such a buried mousehole
of a few isolated words in a Senate report. If statutory repeals by
implication are so disfavored, such a characterization of legislative

“alternative procedure” referred, but also about the lack of legislative history supporting a contrary view.
251. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 11, 26.
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history by implication must be even more disfavored.252 OLC’s
reliance is misplaced. At best, this quote is ambiguous; otherwise, it
can be found to support a position contrary to OLC’s.
7. The Specific Cross-Reference in § 508
The final arguments OLC makes to support its preferred reading
come from a skewed reading of § 508(a) and ignores history. For ease
of reference, § 508(a) is reproduced here once again.
(a) In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General,
or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney
General may exercise all the duties of that office, and for
the purpose of section 3345 of title 5 the Deputy
Attorney General is the first assistant to the Attorney
General.
First, OLC posits that § 508(a) “provides that the Deputy Attorney
General ‘may’ serve as Acting Attorney General, not that he ‘must,’
underscoring that the Vacancies Reform Act remains an alternative
means of appointment.”253 Of course, as already shown above, this
OLC assertion is unequivocally false. The term ‘may’ was a stylistic
rephrasing inserted in 1966 by codifiers, not Congress, in lieu of “shall
have power to exercise.”254 The codifiers’ 1966 rephrasing has no legal
authority, and courts know to disregard it in favor of the law’s true
text. Moreover, in 1953, and in 1966, the Vacancies Act had an explicit
252. Of course, reliance on an unsupported committee report interpretation is usually dismissed,
especially where it is unspecific, carries on the same interpretation and practice (e.g., all Vacancy Acts
were thought to be exclusive), and offered no hint of any change in a significant practice and
understanding. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556–57 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (“If this language is
to be controlling upon us, it must be either (1) an authoritative interpretation of what the [] statute meant,
or (2) an authoritative expression of what [] Congress intended. It cannot, of course, be the former, since
it is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the
Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means. Nor can it reasonably be thought to be the
latter—because it is not an explanation of any language that the [] Committee drafted.”).
253. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 6–7 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download [https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY]; see also id. at 7 n.4
(“[S]ection 508 expressly acknowledges that the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant but will
not necessarily serve in the case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General.”).
254. 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) (1977).
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exemption: “This section does not apply to a vacancy in the office of
Attorney General.”255 Clearly, the text unequivocally prohibited using
the Vacancies Act as a method of appointment for the office of
Attorney General. But this is not OLC’s only inaccuracy.
In its second main point, OLC posits that § 508(a)’s specific
cross-reference to 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (along with the “may” reference
disposed of above) are “statutory cross-references [which] confirm
that section 508 works in conjunction with, and does not displace, the
Vacancies Reform Act.”256 But in doing so, OLC not only changes a
prior DOJ position,257 but it also ignores the intent of that provision,
which aimed to empower the Deputy Attorney General to have general
management authority over DOJ.258 But apart from those histories and
intent, OLC’s point fails as a basic and well-settled matter of statutory
interpretation that it ignored: the reference canon.
Supreme Court cases going as far back as 1838, and as recently as
February 2019, make clear that a specifically cross-referenced
provision is to be interpreted as it stood at the time the statute making
the reference was enacted.259 It does not matter if the referenced
255. 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1966); see also 5 U.S.C. § 6 (1952) (“In any of the cases mentioned in sections
4 and 5 of this title except the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the Attorney General, the
President may, in his discretion, authorize and direct the head of any other department or any other officer
in either department . . . .”).
256. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 7; Authority of the President to
Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. 208, 210 n.3 (2007) (“Section 508 itself may give some
indication that it does not displace the Vacancies Reform Act whenever an official in the chain of
succession under 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) remains at the Department. Section 508(a) provides that ‘for the
purpose of section 3345(a) of title 5 the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the Attorney
General.’”).
257. United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (“§ 508 specifies that the
Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant for purposes of § 3345. The Government argues that only
§ 508 applies to the office of Attorney General.”); see also Acting Officers, 6 Op. O.L.C. 119, 121 (1982).
258. See supra notes 52 and 55 and accompanying text.
259. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2019) (Roberts, C.J.) (“[A] statute that refers to another
statute by specific title or section number in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when
the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments.”); Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303,
314 (1938) (“A well-settled canon tends to support the position of respondents: Where one statute adopts
the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions
adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily
into the adopting statute. . . . Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and does
not include subsequent additions or modifications by the statute so taken unless it does so by express
intent.” (citation omitted)); accord NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:7 (7th ed. 2019); see also In re Heath, 144 U.S. 92, 93–94 (1892);
Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 625 (1838) (“It was not an uncommon course of legislation
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provision, here § 3345, was amended later. Since § 508’s
cross-reference was specific and enacted in 1953, § 508 can only work
with § 3345 as it stood in 1953.
Only when the cross-reference is general, for example to a statute as
a whole, are later amendments incorporated.260 So, as a hypothetical,
if the cross-reference said something akin to “for the purposes of the
Vacancies Act,” that general cross-reference would allow for the
dynamic reference to become attached to the current FVRA. But of
course, § 508(a) does not say anything of the sort. Consequently,
OLC’s assumption is again incorrect.
That reference canon is only superseded when the “legislature has
expressly or by strong implication shown its intention to incorporate
subsequent amendments within the statute.”261 Here, legislative intent
clearly supports that no subsequent amendments were ever intended to
be incorporated, especially because § 508 was identified as
specifically retained and grandfathered.
Accordingly, the cross-reference in § 508 must be a static one, made
to the Vacancies Act as it stood in 1953. It does not, as OLC claims,
show an intent to make § 508 “work in conjunction with, and [] not
displace, the Vacancies Reform Act [FVRA].” That much is clear

in the states, at an early day, to adopt, by reference. . . . And such adoption has always been considered as
referring to the law existing at the time of adoption; and no subsequent legislation has ever been supposed
to affect it.”).
260. E.g., Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 603 F.2d 763, 767
(9th Cir. 1979) (finding in both text and intent an example of a general cross-reference: “the provisions
of the Act entitled “Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.”); Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp.,
860 F.3d 703, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J.), rev’d and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 759, and vacated,
760 F. App’x 11 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Atkinson itself correctly acknowledged that a “statute [that] refers to
a subject generally adopts the law on the subject,” including “all the amendments and modifications of
the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted.” (quoting Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev.
Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1998))). Such a general cross-reference is sometimes called
“dynamic,” changing with later amendments, as opposed to “static,” which in the case of specific
cross-references does not change with later amendments.
261. E.g., Kendall, 37 U.S. at 625; Jackson v. Culinary Sch. of Wash., 788 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (D.D.C.
1992) (citing 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:08 (4th ed. 1984)); see also Dir., Office
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d 310, 322 (7th Cir.
1977) (“When a statute adopts the general law on a given subject, the reference is construed to mean that
the law is as it reads thereafter at any given time including amendments subsequent to the time of adoption.
This is to be contrasted with adoption by reference of limited and particular provisions of another statute,
in which case the reference does not include subsequent amendments.” (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:07 (4th ed. 1973))).
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because the Vacancies Act in 1953: (1) did not authorize a third
category of employees to act in a PAS office, as was the purported
authority for Mr. Whitaker; and (2) explicitly forbade the President
from displacing the first assistant for the office of the Attorney
General. Furthermore, there was never any tie-in between § 508 and
the Vacancies Act as a whole in 1953, and there still is no tie-in to the
FVRA as a whole today.
OLC’s invalid argument does however raise many other problems,
both in light of the canon and apart from it. For over a half-century,
from 1953 to the present, DOJ has taken the position that a Deputy
Attorney General acting as Attorney General under § 508 has no time
limit. But if one assumes, as OLC now claims, the Deputy Attorney
General succession dynamically “works in conjunction” with the
Vacancies Act because of the cross-reference inserted in 1953, it
would not only mean that the Deputy could be displaced, but also that
the time limits of the Vacancies Act would apply. But DOJ has never
so held.262 From well before 1953 to 1988, the time limit that attached
to anyone under the Vacancies Act, even the first assistant, was thirty
days.263 Yet history has at least three examples where the Deputy acted
for a period longer than thirty days between 1953 and 1988.264 Clearly,
262. DOJ has never so held and no such argument by DOJ has been found before 1998. Relatedly, it
should be noted that only once has a court construed the interplay of both § 3345 and § 508, albeit
extremely awkwardly and unpersuasively—and without analysis under the reference canon. In Lucido, a
court held that the initial authority for Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to act as Attorney General
was § 3345, and after 30 days the Vacancies Act authority expired and § 508 offered subsequent authority
for the period starting on the 31st day. United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1151 (E.D. Mich.
1974). Significantly, at that time, DOJ told the court there was no tie-in with the Vacancies Act and
“argue[d] that only § 508 applies to the office of Attorney General.” Id. Clearly, the DOJ has changed its
position to suit the desired outcome of this President. The better reading was had by Halmo, where,
according to OLC, the court reached the conclusion that if there is a general source of delegation authority
and a specific one, the “special source of authority prevails.” United States v. Halmo, 386 F. Supp. 593,
595 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See Memorandum from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., supra note 107.
263. See 5 U.S.C. § 7 (1952) (“A vacancy . . . must not be temporarily filled under the provisions of
sections 4–6 of this title for a longer period than thirty days.”); 5 U.S.C. § 3348 (1966) (same language as
§ 7, but in the new code location); Filling the Vacancy Following the Death of the Sec’y of War, 1 Op.
O.L.C. Supp. 32, 40 (Sept. 21, 1936) (recounting legislative history of the 1891 amendment to the
Vacancies Act, where the Senate rejected the idea that someone might serve as the head of a department
indefinitely); Vacancy in Office of Sec’y of State, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 139, 141 (1920) (holding the
Undersecretary of State was limited to 30 days under the Vacancies Act’s first assistant provision); see
also sources cited supra note 24.
264. United States v. Guzek, 527 F.2d 552, 560 n.10 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting and restating the
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DOJ did not think that § 508 worked in conjunction with the Vacancies
Act then, or those three separate instances would have been unlawful.
And because even now, the reference canon takes a snapshot and
freezes the first assistant specific cross-reference in § 508(a) to the
time limit in 1953, no Deputy Attorney General today could act in the
office of Attorney General for longer than thirty days, if indeed the
cross-reference incorporated more than just one provision. Thus, if
OLC’s “works-in-conjunction” assumption is correct, not only would
those three historical instances have been illegal, but then-Deputy
Attorney General William Barr’s acting service for 103 days in 1991
would also have been illegal.265
Other anomalies would also follow. Under OLC’s wishful reading,
the Deputy Attorney General would be time-limited, but the next
twelve successors266 under § 508(b) would not have any time limits.
Why would Congress make such an odd result?
For all of these reasons, OLC does not have a proper reading of
either the cross-reference or its legal effect.
B. Canons of Construction: How to Read the Two Statutes
Together
With OLC’s statutory arguments dispelled, a proper statutory
analysis can now be quickly introduced. To aid in that analysis, several
primary canons of statutory construction are introduced below.
Unsurprisingly, they will all point to a common-sense construction of
the two statutes: only § 508 controls who is authorized to become the
Acting Attorney General. The lessons taken from these analyses apply

government’s brief, which stated, “There have been at least six (sic) instances since 1880 (three of them
since 1964) during which the office of Attorney General has been temporarily filled for a period in excess
of 30 days” and listing one as Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark who acted as Attorney General for
151 days in 1966); see also Acting Attorneys Gen., 8 Op. O.L.C. 39, 40 (1984) (listing Deputy Attorney
General Richard G. Kleindienst as acting Attorney General for 103 days in 1972; and listing Deputy
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach as acting Attorney General for 160 days beginning in 1964).
265. E.g., David Johnston, Barr Is Confirmed on Voice Vote as 77th Attorney General of U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/21/us/barr-is-confirmed-on-voice-vote-as77th-attorney-general-of-us.html [https://perma.cc/GW74-MQXD].
266. See supra note 9.
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to not only the Attorney General Succession Statute in § 508, but to
any office-specific succession statute versus FVRA.
1. Is There an Ambiguity in FVRA?
The first question to ask in statutory construction is the most basic.
Is there ambiguity in the statute so that a reasonable person might infer
at least two different meanings? Here, the answer can only be yes.
“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”267
The language used in FVRA clearly causes ambiguity. OLC’s
interpretation of the term “exclusive,” while highly unlikely, is, at a
first uninformed glance, objectively plausible—although still unclear.
But after the histories and analyses presented herein, if it is not
definitively clear that the designation statutes were exempted and
control by their own terms, it is at the very least ambiguous.268
Moreover, that OLC already resorted to legislative history in an
attempt to support its position suggests that even it recognized there
was ambiguity. Any time a party has to claim it has the correct
interpretation because nothing in the text of the statute clearly refutes
its position, it should create pause: “the Vacancies Reform Act
nowhere says that, if another statute remains in effect, the Vacancies
Reform Act may not be used.” 269 And finally, when even the White
House Counsel took a position in 2001 that directly aligned with this

267. Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)); see also Cook Inlet Tribal Council v. Mandregan,
348 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Generally, a statute’s text is only ambiguous if, after ‘employing
traditional tools of statutory construction,’ a court determines that Congress did not have a precise
intention on the question at issue.”).
268. A point not mentioned above is that the term “designates” alone creates a facial ambiguity because
it implies a requirement and means that certain statutes are “set apart for a specific purpose, office, or
duty.” Designate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/designate
[https://perma.cc/D9MN-3AR8] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (“[T]o indicate and set apart for a specific
purpose, office, or duty”).
269. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 6 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download [https://perma.cc/BKP5-ASGY]
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Article’s conclusions regarding § 508 and went against OLC’s, 270 an
inquiry beyond plain text is necessary.
Once an ambiguity is determined, a court must turn to other methods
of statutory construction, to include “examin[ing] its legislative
history, predecessor statutes, pertinent court decisions, and
post-enactment administrative interpretations.”271 Such context and
history has already been extensively recounted above, and it all points
contrary to OLC’s position and to § 508 as controlling. This alone
should end the matter: if ambiguous, turn to legislative history to
clarify. But for the sake of thoroughness, and to appease even the most
exacting judge, other canons will be considered as if either an
ambiguity did not exist or as if legislative history and context somehow
did not resolve the issue.
2. Is There a Conflict Between § 508 and FVRA?
In its opinion on this issue, OLC goes into great depth on several
topics; but conspicuously, it strains itself to avoid reading FVRA and
§ 508 as conflicting. The reason for such avoidance is fairly evident.
If the two statutes conflict, then canons of statutory construction kick
in to resolve the conflict. But instead of turning to these canons, which
would invariably hurt their position, OLC makes an unusual assertion:
that the President is able to pick and choose from the two statutes—that
they coexist.272 That is quite a unique position, especially when one
270. Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op. O.L.C. 208, 210 (2007)
(citing Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to the Heads of Fed. Exec.
Dep’ts on Agency Reporting Requirements Under the Vacancies Reform Act 2 (Mar. 21, 2001),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0108/ML010860191.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQQ-2YY2]); see also id.
(“Positions for which another statute designates who shall serve as an acting officer, or for which another
statute specifically authorizes the President, a court, or the head of an executive department to designate
an acting officer, are also exempt.”); id. at 2 n.2 (“For example, because 28 U.S.C. § 508 governs who
shall act as Attorney General in the case of a vacancy, the Vacancies Reform Act does not apply to the
position of Attorney General unless there is no official serving in any of the positions designated by
section 508 to act as attorney general in the case of a vacancy.”).
271. E.g., In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Where the statutory
text is ambiguous, however, we may ‘look to other interpretive tools, including the legislative history’ in
order to determine the statute’s best meaning.” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 567 (2005))).
272. Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 7 (“508 works in conjunction
with, and does not displace, the Vacancies Reform Act . . . the Vacancies Reform Act remains available,
notwithstanding section 508.”).
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statute, § 508, is written in mandatory and automatic terms.
Unfortunately for OLC, it is also untenable. There is simply no
avoiding the conflict generated between the two statutes, as OLC
interprets them. One, § 508, is specific and authorizes only the Deputy
Attorney General to act as the head of DOJ. The other, FVRA, is
general and was used to purportedly authorize a DOJ employee to skip
over several designated PAS officers to lead the DOJ. Two different
statutes, two different results, with two different people for one
position. Under OLC’s reading, a conflict could not be clearer.
Consequently, if unambiguous, the statutes can only be reconciled
using canons of statutory construction.
3. Did One Statute Repeal the Other, Explicitly or Implicitly?
An inquiry regarding repeals is simple. All sides agree that no
explicit repeal occurred. And no direct implicit repeal could be argued
because legislative history shows that § 508 was explicitly retained
and grandfathered. But consider whether what OLC argues is still
effectively an implicit repeal. If, as all sides agree, the FVRA retained
§ 508 and did not affect it, then something else must have happened to
its superseding authority. Because no text in FVRA directly
circumscribed it, it can only have been affected implicitly. Of course,
“‘repeals by implication are not favored’ and will not be presumed
unless the ‘intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and
manifest.’”273 Here, legislative intent is clear but points
overwhelmingly in the opposite direction, against any kind of implicit
repeal. Section 508 continued to remain unaffected and controlling.
4. Is One Statute More Specific than the Other?
One way of avoiding a conflict between statutes is to find that one
has “a specific provision applying to a very specific situation.”274 A
273. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007); see also Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (stating that “repeals by implication are not favored” and refusing to
read “congressional silence as effectuating a repeal by implication,” instead finding that legislative intent
was “to the contrary” of any kind of repeal).
274. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550.
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well-established canon of construction is that the specific always
trumps the general,275 even if the general statute is later-enacted.276
Thus, any reliance on the fact that FVRA was enacted after § 508 is
irrelevant. The later-enacted canon only applies to the same subject
matter.277 The fact that § 508 specifies succession for one office,
whereas FVRA speaks in general terms, makes § 508 alone control.
5. Incoherent Results
If every court were swindled by OLC’s suggestion that FVRA is
somehow an alternative to § 508 and similar statutes, it would lead to
incoherent and nonsensical results. Here are just a few consequences
of allowing such an unsupported reading.
First, as was the case with Mr. Whitaker, an unconfirmed senior
employee could supervise and have vast authority—even de facto
removal powers—over officials confirmed by the Senate with the firm
knowledge that they might lead the particular department.
Another incoherency arises when one considers military
statutes—the very same statutes that Senators Byrd, Thompson,
Glenn, Lieberman, Thurmond, and indeed all GAC Senators clearly
intended to remain controlling.278 Among the list of forty-some
positions identified as retained in the Senate Report are several
military senior commanders, including the Commandant of the Marine
275. Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Fed. Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 717, 720 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(“Where statutes deal with a subject in both general and detailed terms, and there is conflict between the
two, the detailed expression prevails.”).
276. E.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (“It is a basic principle of
statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged
by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”); Morton, 417 U.S. at 550–51 (“Where
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment.”); Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883) (“According to
the well-settled rule, that general and specific provisions, in apparent contradiction, whether in the same
or different statutes, and without regard to priority of enactment, may subsist together, the specific
qualifying and supplying exceptions to the general.”).
277. Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“[I]f the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the
earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest;
otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak . . . .”).
278. See Hearings, supra note 74; ROSENBERG, supra note 29; Memorandum from Fred Ansell to
Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 113; Thompson Statement, supra note 101.
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Corps.279 The applicable statute requires that the position be held by
an active-duty Marine Corps officer.280 It also requires that the
Assistant Commandant have the grade of full four-star general, as the
Commandant does. But the Assistant Commandant also “shall perform
the duties of the Commandant” when there is a vacancy.281 Under the
reasoning of OLC and the alternative approach, any senior DoD
civilian employee or any Senate-confirmed officer could be appointed
thereto using FVRA. The same would be true of many other military
positions.282 Such results would be incoherent. They would also run
afoul of other laws involving military officer commissions.
Nevertheless, under the alternative reading of FVRA, that result would
ensue.
6. The Constitutional Avoidance Canon
“Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, [a court’s] duty is to adopt
the latter.”283 The canon of constitutional avoidance was originally
based on probable meaning of the legislature and has since evolved to
be justified as avoiding conflicts with the legislature.284 In either case,
the principles of legislative intent, the presumption against
unconstitutionality, and the respect for the separation of powers all call
for a reading of the FVRA that does not implicate grave constitutional
concerns.
If OLC’s reading were true, many constitutional questions and
concerns would arise: How can an employee act as an officer, and a
principal officer at that? How does FVRA make an employee an acting
officer if FVRA does not confer an appointment and only authorizes
one to perform the functions and duties of an office? How can an
279. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 16 (1998) (listed sixteenth).
280. 10 U.S.C. § 5044(a) (2018).
281. Id. § 5044(d)(1).
282. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 154 (2018) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs); 10 U.S.C. § 3034 (2018) (Army Chief
of Staff); 10 U.S.C. § 5035(d)(2) (2018) (Chief of Naval Operations); 10 U.S.C. § 8034 (2018) (USAF
Chief of Staff).
283. U.S. ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
284. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 248–49 (2012).
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employee act as an officer if no commission is granted, especially in
light of recess appointees being granted written commissions? Is
FVRA’s allowance for one to act in office longer than a recess
appointment problematic? Are such designations under FVRA
allowed if there is no exigency and if the Senate is in session? Could
an employee who acts as a principal officer then appoint inferior
officers if Congress vested such authority in the office at issue? And is
FVRA the type of law, and specific enough, to satisfy Article II,
Section Two’s requirement that Congress “may by law vest the
Appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the
President alone”?
However, if § 508 alone controls—at least in this instance—real,
grave, and first-impression constitutional questions and any
unforeseen, wide-ranging implications therefrom can be avoided.
To preempt statutory and especially constitutional concerns, OLC
set forth a lengthy argument in its opinion explaining why it is
permissible for a President to use the FVRA to appoint Mr.
Whitaker.285 The constitutional analyses were in-depth and complex.
Those other arguments are not judged here. But simply note the effort
and length of OLC’s arguments. In sharp contrast, neither the Senate
nor Congress even considered the rather significant constitutional
implications of FVRA. Those effects may have been more muted with
respect to inferior officers, but if FVRA was truly thought capable of
displacing each department’s principal officer, one would hope that at
least a single voice of caution would have murmured among 535
lawmakers. In other words, Congress’s complete silence on FVRA’s
constitutionality speaks louder than OLC’s extensive arguments. But
if instead, the Senate and Congress thought the United States’ most
important principal officers had an established, distinct, and
superseding order of succession, as ten of the then-fourteen Executive
departments did,286 it may have been more easily presumed that those
285. See Memorandum from Steven Engel, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Emmet
T. Flood, Counsel to the President (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/WhitakerOLC.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4LB-Y3WE].
286. The Departments of State, Interior, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development were the 4
out of 14 departments that did not have a specific succession statute. Although, at the time each had
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statutes could not be displaced in favor of FVRA or that all
departments had such statutes that would control.
7. Is a Harmonious Reading Possible to Give Effect to Both
Statutes?
The best way to avoid an ambiguity, conflict, implicit repeal,
incoherency, or constitutional questions in OLC’s reading is simply to
find a better way of reading the statutes, or to “give effect to both if
possible.”287 Indeed, this is perhaps the most prime canon of
construction:
When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly
touching on the same topic, [a] Court is not at liberty to pick
and choose among congressional enactments and must
instead strive to give effect to both . . . . A party seeking to
suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one
displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of showing a
clearly expressed congressional intention that such a result
should follow. The intention must be ‘clear and manifest.’
And in approaching a claimed conflict, we come armed with
the ‘stron[g] presum[ption]’ that repeals by implication are
‘disfavored’ and that ‘Congress will specifically address’
preexisting law when it wishes to suspend its normal
operations in a later statute.288
Due consideration must be given to the reading that harmonizes both
statutes and violates neither. As emphasized, statutes like § 508, apart
from being more specific, are automatic and required. There is plainly
no way to use FVRA and not violate § 508. However, § 508 can vest
Executive orders designating succession and which generally followed each department’s rank structure.
Today, there are 15 Executive departments with the addition of Homeland Security, which also has its own
succession statute. 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1), (g) (2018).
287. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).
288. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).
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and not violate FVRA. It is a simple “may” versus “shall.” FVRA is
by its own terms permissive; the President “may direct an officer or
employee.”289 There is no requirement that a president does so. In
sharp contrast, § 508 is required. There is no discretion afforded. The
designee, here the Deputy Attorney General, “shall have power” to be
Acting Attorney General, followed by other officials who “shall act.”
This aligns precisely with the use and understanding of these statutes
before FVRA. It also squares precisely with the legislative intent of
grandfathering and exempting them. Only when the required list of
successors in § 508 are exhausted is there no conflict. At that point,
and only then, the President can use FVRA to designate other officers
in a further order of succession.
This simple and harmonious reading of FVRA and another statute
makes practical sense too. Unlike a § 3347(a)(1)(B)-category
statute—for instance § 508, which automatically vests power to act in
another specified official, in effect immediately filling the
vacancy—§ 3347(a)(1)(A)-category statutes remain open until
someone is designated.290 That is why § 3347(a)(1)(A) statutes still
supersede FVRA initially and are looked to first; however, because of
their permissive and discretionary nature (e.g., “may appoint”), they
can be disregarded in favor of the FVRA—because the position would
not have been filled and it is still practical and possible to choose either
statutory mechanism.291 But when § 508 automatically vests (e.g.,
“shall act”), the position is filled.292 And the FVRA contains absolutely
no authority beyond its own provisions to displace other appointments
or statutes.
Accordingly, the same result is reached either through the
overwhelming
evidence
in
legislative
history,
through
289. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(3) (2018).
290. Id. § 3347(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2018).
291. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 508.
292. This was true even in this instance. Attorney General Sessions “resigned” on November 7, 2018.
But the President did not formally designate Mr. Whitaker until either November 8th or November 13th,
when DOJ received the designation letter. See Memorandum from the President to Matthew Whitaker
(Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/November-8-2018Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9G4-HQTK]. Consequently, depending on whether the President’s Tweet
provided adequate designation authority or whether the memo did so, the Deputy Attorney General might
have technically, even if not functionally, been the acting head of DOJ for about a day.
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well-established canons of construction, or through a basic
harmonization that gives effect to both statutes. In each instance, the
best reading of both statutes is that § 508 first escapes FVRA and then
trumps it. Automatic and specific vesting statutes like § 508 that afford
no discretion must be followed and FVRA cannot be used in their
stead. This construction avoids serious constitutional questions raised
by elevating an employee to become a principal officer. It gives
deference to prior judgments of Congress as to which officer is best
suited to lead a department. It avoids reading an implicit repeal of over
125 years of practice without any hint of discussion. It ensures
practical continuity by someone confirmed by the Senate to be
“well-qualified in law.” It keeps DOJ policies from being suddenly
changed by non-senior and temporary officials. It avoids favoritism
and potential quid pro quos. It follows the clear legislative intent. And,
most importantly, it follows the text of both laws.
C. Enforcement and FVRA’s Non-Ratification Provision
A separate, but deeply intertwined topic in FVRA warrants attention
before concluding: the enforcement mechanism in § 3348. This part of
FVRA answers what happens when someone serves in a PAS position
in violation of FVRA. And it too has been misconstrued by DOJ.
The issue is relevant to this debate because, to prevent the D.C.
Circuit from reaching the merits of the FVRA versus § 508 question,
the subsequent confirmed Attorney General ratified one of the only
known formal actions made by Mr. Whitaker roughly a week before
that court’s oral argument.293 Unfortunately, the last-minute
ratification tactic meant not only that court did not consider the
office-specific statute arguments presented here, but it also did not
consider that FVRA itself precluded ratification of Mr. Whitaker’s

293. Indeed, the Justice Department was concerned about litigation on the very issues raised here. As a
result, and to impose a procedural block, William Barr, ratified an action taken by an Acting Attorney
General. It is the first time in the history of DOJ the actions of an Acting Attorney General were formally
ratified. Mr. Barr did so expressly because of “litigation in which parties have argued that Mr. Whitaker
was not validly serving as the Acting Attorney General, as either a statutory or constitutional matter.”
Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 9239 (Mar. 14, 2019).
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rulemaking because the function was exclusively assigned to the
Attorney General by statute.294
Briefly summarizing the anti-ratification provision, FVRA’s
§ 3348(d) voids the actions of a person who is not properly acting
under FVRA or under the office-specific succession statutes it retained
in § 3347: “An action taken [not in accordance with] section 3345,
3346, or 3347 . . . in the performance of any function or duty of a
vacant office . . . shall have no force or effect.” And more importantly,
“[a]n action that has no force or effect . . . may not be ratified.”295
Ample evidence throughout legislative history confirms that § 3348
was written and enacted as direct response to a D.C. Circuit case,
captioned Doolin,296 to expressly overrule its holdings and to create an
effective enforcement mechanism for non-compliance with FVRA.297
In Doolin, an appellate panel declined to reach the merits of whether
an agency’s acting director’s service violated the Vacancies Act
because a subsequent Senate-confirmed director ratified the action that
was challenged.298 Under long-standing circuit precedent on agency,
an act of ratification effectively serves to “remedy the defect . . . from
the initial appointment” and “does not implicate the exception to
mootness for cases that are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading

294. Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Congress expressly charged the Attorney General
with the ‘administration and enforcement’ of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A), and provided that the Attorney General ‘shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of’ the Act,[] id. § 7805; see id. § 7801(a)(2)(A).”); see also infra note 299.
295. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(2).
296. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
297. E.g., SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017)
(“Moreover, in response to Doolin, the FVRA renders actions taken by persons serving in violation of the
Act void ab initio.”); id. (“FVRA ‘impose[s] a sanction for noncompliance,’ thereby ‘[o]verruling several
portions of [Doolin]’” (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S6414 (daily ed. June 16, 1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/06/16/CREC-1998-06-16-pt1-PgS6405-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FLS2-K2CU])); 144 CONG. REC. S6414 (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson)
(“Overruling several portions of that [Doolin] decision have become a priority.”); S. REP. NO. 105-250,
at 5–7 (1998); id. at 11 (“To ensure an effective enforcement mechanism and to overturn the recent
decision [in Doolin] . . . , the Committee believes that replacement of the existing Vacancies Act is
necessary.”); id. at 19–20 (“The Committee expects that litigants with standing to challenge purported
agency actions taken in violation of these provisions will raise non-compliance with this legislation in a
judicial proceeding challenging the lawfulness of the agency action. It is concerned that the ratification
approach taken by the court in Doolin would render enforcement of the Vacancies Reform Act a nullity
in many instances.”).
298. Doolin, 139 F.3d at 214.
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review.’”299 Thus, Doolin and other cases analyzing ratifications under
the general laws of agency usually have not reached the merits of
whether a person was illegally acting in office expressly because such
actions are often ratified before judicial review.
But shortly after Doolin, the FVRA’s authors recognized that “the
ratification approach taken by the court in Doolin would render
enforcement of the Vacancies Reform Act a nullity in many
instances.”300 As said elsewhere in the Senate Report on FVRA, “if
any subsequent acting official or anyone else can ratify the actions of
a person who served beyond the length of time provided by the
Vacancies Act, then no consequence will derive from an illegal acting
designation.”301 Thus it is clear that § 3348 was written expressly to
overturn Doolin and to ensure there would be consequences for
illegally acting in office.302
But DOJ either misses or ignores all of that history and intent.
Instead, DOJ suggests a construction of key parts of § 3348 that would
make few, if any, officers and duties subject to any consequences of
FVRA’s enforcement mechanism.303 What’s more, DOJ’s
299. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 13, 14, judgment entered, 762 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Space prevents a
thorough analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Guedes, which declined to review the § 508 versus
FVRA issue presented herein because of the Senate-confirmed Attorney General’s ratification, which was
done just days before that same panel was set to review the statutory issue on its merits. Id. at 11;
Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 9239 (the Attorney General ratifying Whitaker’s rule and
expressly citing concern for litigation over the statutory and constitutional issues). Clearly, the ratification
was made by DOJ to procedurally block a merits consideration. But critically, the D.C. Circuit in Guedes,
hurried by an accelerated briefing schedule for a preliminary injunction, only analyzed ratification based
on the general and usual agency doctrine. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 12. The panel was not briefed on nor did
they consider the history, analysis, or arguments presented herein that FVRA statutorily precludes
ratification. Id. (stating the appellant did not challenge the ratification statutorily under FVRA, and in
dicta, without any analysis or argument, classifying § 3348 as “only prohibiting the ratification of
nondelegable duties”). In shorter terms, because of DOJ’s last-minute ratification, the appellate panel and
appellants were both hastily precluded from examining the statutory prohibition on ratification—which,
as is shown here, was in fact applicable in that case.
300. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 20.
301. Id. at 8; see also 144 CONG. REC. S11,021–22 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998),
https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28-pt1-PgS11021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PYL-EUCM] (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“[The Doolin court] allowed the
later Senate-confirmed director to ratify the actions of the prior acting director . . . . This is not what the
framers thought that they had established. It runs contrary to the Vacancies Act itself and corrective action
therefore is necessary.”).
302. See supra notes 297, 299–301.
303. Brief for Appellees at 70, 73, Guedes, 920 F.3d 1 (Nos. 19-5042, 19-5043, 19-5044, Consolidated),
2019 WL 1200603, at *70, *73.
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construction would not even make the action and acting officer in
Doolin subject to the enforcement mechanism—the very situation that
§ 3348 was enacted to enforce.
DOJ’s error revolves around key text it misconstrues in its definition
of “function or duty” at § 3348(a)(2) and (a)(2)(A):
(2) the term “function or duty” means any function or duty
of the applicable office that(A)(i) is established by statute; and
(B)(ii) is required by statute to be performed by the
applicable officer (and only that officer);
DOJ’s construction of that definition grafts an extra requirement on
to the provision that is not present in its text: that the duty must
expressly be non-delegable.304 Under DOJ’s view, the duty must be
expressly assigned to one officer by statute, and the statute must
separately and expressly state that duty is not allowed to be delegated.
Otherwise, DOJ argues, delegation or housekeeping statutes like 28
U.S.C. § 510, which allow duties to be delegated to any person, make
a duty able to be performed by more than one person, and thus excludes
such duties from the definition of what cannot be ratified.305 But that
is not what the text requires.
A plain-text reading—and one that wholly squares with the
legislative intent and history—is that the “function or duty” must be
expressly granted by the source of law to one officer and only one
officer. Where Congress allowed a specific duty to be performed by
one of two or more officers, where the duty is generally granted to an
agency or organization, or where the duty is expressly said to be
delegable in the same statute that authorized the duty, the definition
does not apply.
A plain reading does not say that the source statute, or any second
one, must prevent that specifically assigned duty from being further
delegated under a general housekeeping statute. To read this proviso
304. Brief for Appellees, supra note 303.
305. Id.
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as DOJ does makes it a practical nullity, if for no other reason than
because every single Executive department and many agencies have
vesting and delegation statutes, with almost no limit on what may be
delegated.306
Thus, under DOJ’s reading, only an exceedingly rare type of statute
would qualify. Such a statute would have to expressly reject the broad
authority of Executive branch agency heads to be responsible for all
duties through vesting statutes, like § 509, or separately reject the
delegation statutes that permit agency heads to delegate any function
vested in them or their agency, like § 510. Initial searches found no
duties or functions assigned by statute to DOJ PAS officers that would
qualify under that kind of reading. And to date, DOJ has not identified
any such statute that would qualify across all the Executive
departments. It is quite likely that if such statutes are found, they will
number so few and be so obscure as to inherently disprove DOJ’s
point. That could not have been what Congress had in mind, and it was
not what was written in the text of the act.
Despite all the evidence and statements presented above that show
§ 3348 was written to overturn Doolin, DOJ misses a main point: under
its construction, which grafts general delegation authority statutes onto
any other specific statutory duty, Doolin would not have been
overturned at all. The court in Doolin expressly noted that the acting
officer at issue had statutory authority “to delegate ‘any power.’”307
But that parallel is ignored. As is the fact that there is no practical
difference between the general delegation statute in Doolin and the
general delegation statute for DOJ or any other Executive department
head for that matter.308

306. See supra note 27 (listing the codified locations of every department’s vesting and delegation
statutes).
307. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
12 U.S.C. § 1462a(h)(4)(A)(ii) (1994)).
308. The acting official at issue in Doolin had a general delegation statute functionally indistinguishable
from § 510. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(h)(4)(A)(ii) (1994) (“The Director may . . . delegate to any
employee, representative, or agent any power of the Director), with 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2018) (“The
Attorney General may . . . authoriz[e] the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the
Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.”), and similar statutes cited supra note 27.
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It simply does not align that FVRA’s authors so railed against the
result in Doolin, and repeatedly stated FVRA was enacted to overturn
that court’s take on ratification, only to have its lauded enforcement
provision be ineffective in a similar circumstance. Throughout
legislative history the enforcement provision was consistently
described as “an effective enforcement mechanism” and “admittedly
tough.”309 Even White House talking points warned of “administrative
paralysis” as the “consequence of non-compliance” with FVRA
because of that provision.310 Thus, it would be exceedingly odd if
Congress thought that its enforcement provision would be so effective,
while intending it to cover almost no function in any Executive
department because of housekeeping statutes.311
Other legislative history offers support for the plain-text reading
advocated here. For one, DOJ’s reading is quite similar to the reading
the Minority Views called for in the Senate Report, but which was
obviously not adopted, as those views remained in the minority: “It is
imperative that the bill unequivocally ensure that the affected functions
and duties of the office are only those that are expressly deemed
nondelegable by statute or regulation.”312
Plus, in defining what constituted a “function or duty” that could not
be ratified, senators often aligned with this Article’s construction: “any
duties assigned just to that position by statute;”313 “functions and
309. 144 CONG. REC. S12,824 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHZ6-TQXE] (statement of
Sen. Robert Byrd) (“[T]his is an effective, and admittedly tough enforcement mechanism . . . .”).
310. Vacancies Act—Talking Points [App. at A-113] (found in archives of Senator Byrd and stapled to
a letter from the White House); Letter from Erskine Bowles to the Senate Majority Leader, The White
House (July 28, 1998) [App. at A-88] (“[P]rocedures [are in] the bill that absolutely disable particular
positions from taking binding legal actions . . . seriously disrupt[ing] the functioning of the
Government.”); see also 144 CONG. REC. S12,824 (using similar terms to respond to said White House
talking points).
311. Congress was well aware of what vesting and delegation statutes did and knew that each Executive
department had them. See supra section II.C; see also Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg, Cong.
Research Serv., on Validity of Designation of Bill Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil
Rights, supra note 97 (Appendix 1 of that memorandum, listing the vesting and delegation statutes of each
Executive department).
312. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 36 (1998) (Minority Views of two senators) (“Absent that clarity, whole
components of federal agencies would have to stop their work.”).
313. 144 CONG. REC. S11,026 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/1998/09/28/CREC-1998-09-28-pt1-PgS11021.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SZ-NC2X] (statement of
Sen. Carl Levin).
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duties that are specified to be performed by that official;”314 or “duties
that . . . are established by statute and are required to be performed
only by the applicable officer.”315 Even the White House’s talking
points, distributed to Democratic senators, described the enforcement
mechanism as covering “functions assigned to that office and no
other.”316
To be fair, there is some ambiguity in the Senate Report, which a
few times characterizes the definition as covering “non-delegable”
duties. But how DOJ interprets this characterization is not how the
Senate Report explained it. First, “nondelegable duties” was used as a
term of art in the GAC minority staff draft.317 In that draft, § 3348 had
a set definition for “nondelegable duties”: “Any functions and duties
exclusively assigned to the vacant office.”318 And because only the
head of the agency could perform those duties, it is reasonable to
presume that duties specified became nondelegable once vested in the
agency head.319 Next, consider page twenty of the Senate Report,
where the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board is
presented as having the “non-delegable” duty to “investigate and
charge potential violations of the underlying regulatory statute.”320
Statutory text and legislative history show that this example referred
to 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).321 But nowhere in that statute does it expressly
say that those duties of the General Counsel are non-delegable. In fact,

314. 144 CONG. REC. S6414 (daily ed. June 16, 1998), https://www.congress.gov/
crec/1998/06/16/CREC-1998-06-16-pt1-PgS6405-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLS2-K2CU] (statement of
Sen. Fred Thompson); see also Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note
164 [App. at A-63] (explaining duties in § 3348 as “those that are specifically to be performed by the
officer in the vacant office”); Transcript of June 17th GAC Meeting, supra note 86 [App. at A-66, A-74]
(described by Senator Thompson as “specific functions of that officer”).
315. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17.
316. See sources cited supra note 310.
317. See Memorandum from Fred Ansell to Senator Fred Thompson, supra note 145 [App. at
A-48–A-49] (attaching the Democratic staff draft).
318. Id.
319. Indeed, 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b)(2) contains authority identical to the vesting aspect of housekeeping
statutes and separately allows an agency head to perform duties but not redelegate them.
320. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 20.
321. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1998) (“He [the General Counsel] shall have final authority, on behalf of the
Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title,
and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board.”); S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 16 (no.
24 on the list of retained statutes citing that statute).
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the D.C. Circuit expressly recognized that the same official can and
has often “delegated his authority to investigate charges and issue
complaint to thirty-two regional directors.”322 But to the authors of
FVRA, that statute would still have met the definition of “function or
duty.” The same is true of the duties of several other officers, which
clearly would have qualified because the offices had to be specifically
excluded in § 3348(e).323 Furthermore, if vesting and delegation
statutes were already thought to generally apply, FVRA’s
§ 3348(b)(2), which vests “functions and duties” in an agency head
when an office must remain vacant, would itself be redundant and
unnecessary.
In the end, DOJ’s construction of the ratification provision in § 3348
aims to avoid judicial review of whether someone is serving in
violation of FVRA or the specific succession statutes it grandfathered
in § 3347. But if courts examine this statutory non-ratification
provision within FVRA, they should find that this enforcement
mechanism in FVRA is not toothless. Vesting and delegation statutes
clearly do not exempt FVRA’s enforcement mechanism from applying
to practically any duty in the Executive branch. In this way, the merits
of the office-specific statute debate can be resolved, and the sole
conclusion called for by so many ordinary tools of statutory
construction can be applied to give full effect to FVRA.324

322. SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB., 796 F.3d 67, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017).
323. For example, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) were added to all departments and to the EPA and
NASA as PAS officers by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, § 205, 104 Stat.
2838, 2842. No part of that law expressly said that their duties were non-delegable. Instead, that act
imposed specific duties on each agency CFO specifically: “An agency [CFO] shall . . . .” 104 Stat. at
2843. The same is true of Inspectors General in (e)(3). The Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95−452, 92 Stat. 1101, lists specific duties assigned to specific Inspectors General in each department but
never says any of their duties may not be delegated.
324. DOJ would undoubtedly argue that courts already have reached the merits. But at the time this
Article was submitted only one district court has ruled on this issue: Guedes v. ATF, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109
(D.D.C. 2019). Notably, that court did not consider or analyze most of the arguments presented here.
Space also precludes addressing cases like English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 320, 322 (D.D.C.
2018), where an express-statement requirement was key in the court’s decision, and where the court
looked to § 508 as an example of a statute where “Congress intended to displace the FVRA.” This author
has written a more in-depth article specifically on the anti-ratification provision to more fully present the
arguments briefly introduced here as well others that offer significant support: Migala, Vacancies Act III,
supra note 95.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, this Article concludes that although awkwardly written,
FVRA did not offer an optional order of succession to the office of
Attorney General. Rather, § 508 alone controls who may act as
Attorney General because FVRA categorically grandfathered and
exempted office-specific succession statutes, including § 508. As a
result, Mr. Whitaker did not validly serve as Acting Attorney General.
And FVRA’s enforcement mechanism in § 3348 prevents certain
actions of his from being ratified.
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